Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

TEXAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Todd K. Brown as Executive Director of the TWCC, and the Subsequent Injury Fund and its Administrator, Claudia Nadig, Appellants,

v.

OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 05-97-01058-CV.

|

March 15, 2000.

Before Justices OVARD, ROACH, and DODSON.¹

OPINION

DODSON.

*1 The Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission (the TWCC), Todd K. Brown as executive director of the TWCC, and the TWCC Subsequent Injury Fund and its administrator, Claudia Nadig (collectively, TWCC) bring four points of error challenging a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment granted in favor of Old Republic Insurance Company (Old Republic). Concluding that the matters presented are moot, the trial court’s judgment is reversed, all previous orders are set aside, and the cause is dismissed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action arose from a worker’s compensation claim filed by Rogelio Estrada with the TWCC for an alleged on-the-job injury.² Old Republic was the insurance carrier. The parties were unable to resolve the matter at the benefits review conference (BRC). The matter then proceeded to a contested case hearing before a hearing officer. On August 27, 1996, the hearing officer awarded Estrada a twenty percent impairment rating and ordered Old Republic to immediately pay a lump sum amount of accrued impairment income benefits to Estrada. Old Republic appealed this decision to an appeals panel of the TWCC.

The Texas Worker’s Compensation Act in effect at the time had no provision for reimbursement of overpayment of benefits ordered by a hearing officer, even if appealed to and reversed by an appeals panel. Old Republic claimed the statute’s deficiency and the hearing officer’s order violated its rights under the United States and Texas Constitutions. On September 20, 1996, Old Republic brought this action in the trial court for a declaratory judgment and injunction against TWCC. In its action, Old Republic sought judgment declaring certain provisions of the Texas Worker’s Compensation Act unconstitutional and a permanent injunction enjoining the TWCC from enforcing the hearing officer’s order.

The TWCC’s appeals panel heard Old Republic’s appeal from the hearing officer’s challenged order and rendered its decision on November 6, 1996. The appeals panel reversed the hearing officer’s order and determined that Estrada’s impairment rating was zero percent, entitling him to no benefits under the Worker’s Compensation Act. There was no appeal from the appeals panel’s decision. Accordingly, the appeals panel’s decision became final and dispositive of Estrada’s claim. The record further shows that Old Republic paid no benefits to Estrada.

On March 25, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment granting the requested permanent injunction and declaring certain provisions of the statute unconstitutional. TWCC appealed from the judgment to this Court.

APPLICABLE LAW AND DISPOSITION

The Texas Worker’s Compensation Act provides a four-tiered system for determining disputed worker’s compensation claims. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Texas Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 945 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, no writ). The first step is a benefit review conference (BRC) conducted by a benefit review officer. See Tex.Lab.Code Ann. §§ 410.021, .022 (Vernon 1996). Parties dissatisfied with the result of a BRC may proceed to the second step, a contested case hearing before a hearing officer. See id. §§ 410.151, .152 (Vernon 1996). The third step in the process is an appeal to an appeals panel. The appeals panel resolves the disputed issues and renders a decision which becomes final unless a party timely appeals to a district court. See id. § 410.205(a), (b) (Vernon Supp.2000). The appeal from the appeals panel to the district court is the fourth step in the administrative scheme. See id.; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 945 S.W.2d at 887.

*2 As the court pointed out in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co ., see id., under some circumstances, a party wrongfully ordered to pay benefits by a benefit review officer (BRC) or by an appeals panel could seek reimbursement of funds paid under the order, if the order was later modified or reversed. See Act of May 12, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 269, § 1, secs. 410.032(b), .205(c), 1993 Tex.Gen.Laws 987, 1202, 1209 (amended 1999) (current version at Tex.Lab.Code Ann. §§ 410.032, .205 (Vernon Supp.2000)). Nevertheless, as Old Republic complained, the code in effect in this instance made no provision for reimbursement of funds paid pursuant to the contested case hearing officer’s decision, even though the decision was appealed and reversed or modified.³

In this instance, Old Republic appealed the contested case hearing officer’s order. The appeals panel reversed the order, and no appeal was taken from the appeals panel’s reversal. Consequently, the appeals panel’s decision became final and dispositive of all matters in controversy between the parties to this appeal. See Tex.Lab.Code Ann. § 410.205(a), (b) (Vernon Supp.2000); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co, 945 S.W.2d at 886; see also Westheimer Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Brockette, 567 S.W.2d 780, 789 (Tex.1978). In this regard, a case on appeal becomes moot when the judgment of the appellate court will no longer have an effect on an existing controversy. See Restrepo v. First Nat’l Bank, 888 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, no writ). Also, it is well settled that an appellate court may only determine cases in which there is an actual existing controversy between parties with conflicting interests. See City of Alamo v. Montes, 934 S.W.2d 85, 85 (Tex.1996); see also Reyna v. City of Weslaco, 944 S.W.2d 657, 662 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ) (noting that a controversy must exist between the parties “at every stage of the legal proceedings”) (citing United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950)). Furthermore, an appellate court may not decide moot or abstract propositions or render advisory opinions. See Montes, 934 S.W.2d at 85; Firemen’s Ins. Co. v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex.1968) (vacating part of trial court judgment rendering advisory opinion); see also Freeman v. Burrows, 141 Tex. 318, 319, 171 S.W.2d 863, 863-64 (1943) (reversing and setting aside appellate and trial court judgments, setting aside all previous orders, and dismissing cause where cause becomes moot on appeal). Consequently, we conclude that this cause became moot when the TWCC’s appeals panel’s decision became final, and no appeal was taken from the appeals panel’s reversal. Furthermore, we point out that the challenged sections of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act were repealed by the legislature. See supra text accompanying note 3. Therefore, we are persuaded that no useful judicial purpose is served by passing on the constitutionality of the challenged sections of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act which are repealed and have no further legal effect in this action or any other future proceedings between the parties. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is reversed, all previous orders are set aside, and the cause is dismissed.

	Footnotes
1		The Honorable Carlton B. Dodson, Justice, Court of Appeals, Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo, Retired, sitting by assignment.
2		Estrada is not a party to this appeal.
3		The legislature amended the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act by deleting sections 410.032(b) and 410.205(c) and adding sections 410.209 and 413.055 regarding overpayments. See Act of May 19, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 955, 1999 Tex.Gen.Laws 3696-98 (current version at Tex.Lab.Code Ann. §§ 410.032, .205(c), .209, 413.055 (Vernon Supp.2000)). The 1999 amendments do not apply to this case, and we apply the statute in effect at the time the contested case hearing decision was issued. See Act of May 19, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 955, sec. 7, 1999 Tex.Gen.Laws 3698.