Court of Appeals of Texas, Beaumont.

Vicki MITCHELL, Appellant,

v.

SERVICE LLOYDS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 09-94-382CV.

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Jan. 25, 1996.

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Motion for Rehearing Overruled Feb. 15, 1996.

Before WALKER, C.J., and BURGESS and STOVER, JJ.

OPINION

STOVER, Justice.

*1 This appeal has its genesis in a final decision, adverse to appellee, made by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeals Panel. From that decision, appellee Service Lloyds Insurance Company (“Service Lloyds”) filed suit in the district court of Montgomery County to set aside such final decision. Service Lloyds requested a jury trial, which began on October 24, 1994. After both sides had rested their case, the appellee made a motion for directed verdict which was granted by the trial court. It is from the granting of appellee’s motion for directed verdict that appellant Mitchell now brings forth her appeal.

Appellant’s sole point of error contends “[t]he Trial Court erred in granting appellee’s motion for a directed verdict.”

This case is controlled by the new Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 401.001, et seq. (Vernon Pamp.1996).¹ Service Lloyds contends there are only two issues involved: (1) did appellant suffer a compensable back injury on February 15, 1993, during the course and scope of her employment; and (2) did she suffer any disability on or after February 15, 1993?

The record reveals that on or about February 15, 1993, Mitchell allegedly suffered a back injury that arose out of and in the course and scope of her employment; a disability resulted therefrom beginning on February 19, 1993, and continuing thereafter. Appellant was employed as an accounts receivable clerk for a car dealership in Conroe, Texas, between December 8, 1992, and early March 1993. Eighteen days after filing a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Board and just prior to the completion of her probationary status with the dealership, appellant was fired by her supervisor. The reasons for her termination were described as poor attendance, excessive time away from her desk, and a confrontational attitude toward other employees.

According to appellant, while at work on February 15, 1993, she picked up four boxes to look at 1992 tax returns and injured her back. Upon lifting the boxes, appellant felt pain in her lower back and lower left side and down her left leg. There were no witnesses to the injury. After her supervisor inquired about the reason for her limp, appellant reported the injury to her supervisor on February 18th, three days after the occurrence. At that time her supervisor had her fill out some reports and sent her to the doctor. The supervisor then filed a notice with the Workers’ Compensation Board.

Appellant saw several doctors regarding her injury up until the time of trial. Appellant was treated with muscle relaxers, anti-inflammatories, pain pills, heating pad, and physical therapy. Initially, appellant was referred to Dr. Johnson at Sadler Clinic in Conroe by her supervisor. Approximately ten days after the injury, she saw Dr. Ray Fitzgerald who diagnosed lumbosacral strain and advised appellant to remain off work pending the results of medication and physical therapy. According to Dr. Fitzgerald’s medical report, the time lost from work could be from four to six weeks. She continued to see Dr. Fitzgerald and also saw several other physicians for treatment.

*2 Service Lloyds disputed the claim of appellant and took the matter up before the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission. The Hearing Officer appointed by the Commission adjudicated the matter, found in favor of Mitchell, set forth Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and ordered Service Lloyds to pay medical and income benefits in accordance with its decision.

Dissatisfied with the outcome of the hearing, Service Lloyds appealed to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeals Panel. Finding no reversible error in the record, the Appeals Panel concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer, and affirmed the decision. The Appeals Panel handed down its decision on August 26, 1993, and Service Lloyds filed its plaintiff’s original petition on September 13, 1993.

We note that appellee acknowledges the narrowness of an appellate court’s review of the evidence in analyzing the grant of a directed verdict. First, we must determine whether there is any evidence of probative force to raise a fact issue on the material questions presented. Next, we must consider all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was directed and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. Szczepanik v. First Southern Trust Co., 883 S.W.2d 648 (Tex.1994). If the record contains any testimony of probative value, either direct or circumstantial, in favor of the party against whom the instructed verdict was granted, we must hold that the instructed verdict was improper. Shelton v. Swift Motors, Inc., 674 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). When a determination has been made that reasonable minds may differ as to the truth of conflicting facts, a determination of the issue is for the jury. Id. at 341; see White v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 651 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.1983).

The evidence in the instant case consists, at least in part, of Mitchell’s own testimony as to the date of her injury, the occurrence of it during the course and scope of her employment, and a description of its effects on her life. There was also testimony from doctors as to her care and treatment after the injury. A party may testify to her own injury. Generally, testimony of an interested witness (in this case, a party), even though uncontradicted, presents an issue to be determined by the jury. Gunter v. Bailey, 808 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1991, no writ). The uncorroborated testimony of an interested witness is not binding on the jury, but raises an issue of fact. Silva v. Enz, 853 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The credibility of witnesses and weight to be given their testimony are questions for the jury. Rodriguez v. Kvasnicka, 710 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

In considering the evidence in a light most favorable to Mitchell, and disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences, we find that there was more than a scintilla of evidence to defeat the granting of the motion for directed verdict. The case should have been submitted to a jury.

*3 Having found that the record contains some testimony of probative value, we sustain appellant’s sole point of error. The judgment below is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

	Footnotes
1		The new Act, initially located in articles 8308-1.01 through 8308-11.10 of Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated, was codified in September 1993. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 401.001, et seq.