Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

MARCUS W. ANDERSON, Appellant

v.

TEXAS MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., Appellee

NO. 14-23-00942-CV

|

Memorandum Opinion filed March 25, 2025

On Appeal from the 55th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2020-07355

Panel consists of Justices McLaughlin, Bridges, and Boatman.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Chad Bridges Justice

*1 Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 25, 2025

Appellant Marcus W. Anderson appeals from the trial court’s take nothing judgment against him. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The facts underlying this appeal are undisputed. Anderson is a commissioned reserve police officer with the Galena Park Police Department. Anderson provides uniformed police officer motorcycle escort services to various types of companies including funeral homes, athletic teams, promotion companies, and various trucking companies. This type of police motorcycle escort service can only be provided by licensed peace officers. Anderson provides his own marked police motorcycle when he provides escort services to private companies. Anderson owns this motorcycle and it is equipped with a siren and emergency lights. Anderson also provides his own police uniform, badge, and other police equipment such as his gun belt and helmet when he works for private companies. Anderson is paid a day rate directly by each client and he pays his own income taxes. Anderson testified that his day rate for motorcycle escort services is $1,200.

Hansa Meyer Heavy Hauling & Rigging USA, LLC is a registered motor carrier located in Texas. Hansa Meyer specializes in hauling oversized loads. In conducting its business, Hansa Meyer utilizes both trucks that it owns as well as trucks provided by owner-operators. When hauling oversized loads, companies such as Hansa Meyer are required to utilize front and rear civil escorts as well as police escorts. While Hansa Meyer uses its own employees to serve as the civil escorts, it hires individual licensed peace officers to handle the police escort duties only when they are needed. The motorcycle police officers handle traffic control during the journey. Hansa Meyer trains its employee civil escorts, but offers no training to the peace officers its uses to perform escort duties.

Hansa Meyer contracted to move a demethanizer tower from a fabricating facility in Baytown, Texas to Pierce, Colorado. Hansa Meyer contacted Deputy J. R. Case of the Waller County Sheriff’s Department about needing two motorcycle police officers to escort the demethanizer tower. According to Leonard Gobert, Hansa Meyer’s corporate representative, it was Hansa Meyer’s normal practice to contact Deputy Case when they needed police escorts and Case would arrange the number of officers Hansa Meyer needed. Deputy Case was not available to handle the escort, so he contacted Anderson. Deputy Case informed Anderson when the load was going to begin, where it was starting from and going, and approximately when it would arrive. Anderson was to provide police escort from Baytown to Perryton, Texas. Anderson, who had worked for Hansa Meyer before, agreed. Anderson never filled out a job application with Hansa Meyer, never interviewed with Hansa Meyer for a position, and had no written contract with Hansa Meyer. Hansa Meyer never restricted Anderson’s ability to provide escort duties to other companies.

Anderson showed up the next day wearing his own police uniform and helmet, and he was driving his own marked police motorcycle. Hansa Meyer provided Anderson no training on directing traffic. Hansa Meyer did provide a radio to Anderson so that he could communicate with the Hansa Meyer vehicles involved in the haul.

*2 While traveling along Highway 105 in Montgomery County, Anderson was injured in a collision with another vehicle. Anderson subsequently filed a claim under Hansa Meyer’s workers’ compensation insurance policy issued by appellee Texas Mutual Insurance Company. Texas Mutual denied the claim, asserting that Anderson was an independent contractor and not an employee of Hansa Meyer. Anderson challenged Texas Mutual’s denial and requested to proceed directly to a Contested Case Hearing at the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation.

An administrative law judge conducted an evidentiary hearing, and determined that Anderson was not an employee of Hansa Meyer but was instead an independent contractor. It then denied Anderson benefits. Anderson appealed to the Division of Workers’ Compensation appeals panel. The appeals panel eventually gave notice that the administrative law judge’s decision would be the agency’s final decision.

Anderson sought judicial review of the appeals panel decision. The trial court conducted a bench trial during which Anderson and the corporate representative of Hansa Meyer testified. The trial court affirmed the Division of Workers’ Compensation decision and rendered judgment in favor of Texas Mutual. The trial court also made findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court concluded that (1) Hansa Meyer was not Anderson’s employer; (2) Hansa Meyer was not a general contractor; (3) Anderson was not a subcontractor under Hansa Mayer; (4) Anderson was an independent contractor on the date of his injury; and (5) Anderson did not sustain a compensable injury. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In his appeal, while Anderson lists four issues challenging the trial court’s take-nothing judgment, he briefs only two. First, Anderson argues that the trial court erred when it failed to find as a matter of law that Hansa Meyer was a general contractor as defined in Section 406.121(1) of the Labor Code at the time of his injury. Then, building on his first issue, Anderson argues the trial court erred when it failed to conclude that he (1) was a subcontractor and deemed employee of Hansa Meyer; and (2) suffered a compensable injury under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act. We address these issues together.

I. Standard of Review

The Texas Workers’ Compensation Act provides exclusive compensation benefits for the work-related injuries of a subscribing employer’s employees. Morales v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 241 S.W.3d 514, 516 (Tex. 2007) (citing Tex. Lab. Code § 408.001(a)). Disputed claims for workers’ compensation benefits normally proceed through a three-step administrative process: a benefit-review conference, a contested-case hearing, and an administrative appeal. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 514 (Tex. 1995); see Tex. Lab. Code §§ 410.021–.034, 410.151–.169, 410.201–.209; see also State Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Martinez, 539 S.W.3d 266, 268–69 (Tex. 2017). A party who has exhausted his administrative remedies and is aggrieved by a final decision of the appeals panel may seek judicial review of that decision. Tex. Lab. Code §§ 410.251–.252; Cont’l Cas. Ins. v. Functional Restoration Assocs., 19 S.W.3d 393, 398 (Tex. 2000).

If a party seeks judicial review of a final appeals panel’s decision regarding “compensability or eligibility for or the amount of income or death benefits,” then the district court reviews the appeals panel decision under a modified de novo standard of review. Rodriguez v. Serv. Lloyds Ins., 997 S.W.2d 248, 253 (Tex. 1999); Tex. Mut. Ins. v. Sonic Sys. Int’l, Inc., 214 S.W.3d 469, 476 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). This means that when, like here, the trial court resolves the dispute through a bench trial, it must consider the appeals panel’s decision. See Tex. Lab. Code § 410.304(b) (“In a trial to the court without a jury, the court in rendering its judgment on an issue described by Section 410.301(a) shall consider the decision of the appeals panel.”); Tex. Mut. Ins., 214 S.W.3d at 476. Other evidence may be admitted as well. See Tex. Lab. Code § 410.306(a) (“Evidence shall be adduced as in other civil trials.”). The party appealing the final decision of the appeals panel bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. § 410.303.

*3 When, like here, the relevant facts are not disputed, the issue on appeal becomes the proper construction of specific statutory provisions and application of those provisions to the undisputed facts of the case. This presents a question of law that we review de novo. See LaLonde v. Gosnell, 593 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex. 2019) (“Deference must be afforded to the trial court’s disposition of disputed facts, but when there are none, as here, our review is entirely de novo.”).

This appeal also requires us to review the trial court’s interpretation and application of various statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law subject to de novo review. LJA Eng’g Inc. v. Santos, 652 S.W.3d 916, 919 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022) (no pet.). Our primary objective in statutory construction is to give effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. We first look to the statute’s text to determine the legislature’s intent. Id. When the statutory text is clear, it is determinative of the legislature’s intent. Id. at 104. In that situation, we give the statute its plain meaning without resorting to rules of construction or extrinsic aids. Id. Only when a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation does a court look beyond its language for assistance in determining legislative intent. Id. We view statutory terms in context, giving them full effect. Id. at 103. We presume that every word of a statute was used for a purpose, and every omitted word was purposefully not chosen. Tex. Law Shield LLP v. Crowley, 513 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). In determining the plain meaning of a statute, we construe the language according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Id. “As a general principle, we eschew constructions of a statute that render any statutory language meaningless or superfluous.” City of Dallas v. TCI West End, Inc., 463 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. 2015).

II. The trial court did not err when it concluded that when Anderson was injured, he was an independent contractor and therefore not an employee of Hansa Meyer.

The ultimate issue in this appeal is whether Anderson suffered a compensable injury entitling him to recover workers’ compensation benefits. If Anderson was an independent contractor when he was injured, then he did not suffer a compensable injury. See Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Stevenson, 622 S.W.3d 273, 277 (Tex. 2021) (stating that recovery of workers’ compensation benefits “is the exclusive remedy of an employee” covered by workers’ compensation insurance coverage); Morales, 241 S.W.3d at 519 (stating that “there are various elements that affect whether an injury is compensable, including the worker’s employment status as an employee or independent contractor at the time of injury”). In reaching its decision that Anderson did not suffer a compensable injury under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the trial court made numerous conclusions of law. The trial court concluded that Anderson was an independent contractor when he was injured, not an employee. It also concluded that Hansa Meyer was not a general contractor and that Anderson was not a subcontractor under Hansa Meyer. On appeal, Anderson contends the trial court erred when it reached these conclusions because he “performed work and provided a service for general contractor Hansa Meyer” and was therefore a deemed employee of Hansa Meyer. We disagree.

*4 Anderson relies on Section 406.123(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, which applies to general contractors who contract with subcontractors who do not themselves have employees:

If a general contractor has workers’ compensation insurance to protect the general contractor’s employees and if, in the course and scope of the general contractor’s business, the general contractor enters into a contract with a subcontractor who does not have employees, the general contractor shall be treated as the employer of the subcontractor for the purposes of this subtitle and may enter into an agreement for the deduction of premiums paid in accordance with Subsection (d).

Anderson’s argument turns on his contention that Hansa Meyer was a general contractor as defined in the Workers’ Compensation Act because it undertook to “procure the performance of work or a service, either separately or through the use of subcontractors.” Tex. Lab. Code § 406.121(1). Anderson contends that the service was the transportation of the demethanizer tower by Hansa Meyer for its client. Anderson contends that he was a subcontractor to Hansa Meyer, and therefore entitled to workers’ compensation benefits under Section 406.123(b), because he agreed to provide a portion of the transportation service Hansa Meyer had agreed to provide its client: a police motorcycle escort. See Tex. Lab. Code § 406.121(5) (defining “subcontractor” as “a person who contracts with a general contractor to perform all or part of the work or services that the general contractor has undertaken to perform”). Anderson concludes this argument by asserting that the trial court erred when it refused to apply Section 406.123(b) of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, which he argues makes him a deemed employee of Hansa Meyer because Anderson (as the subcontractor) did not have any employees while performing the police motorcycle escort services for Hansa Meyer. See id. (providing that a general contractor with workers’ compensation insurance “shall be treated as the employer of the subcontractor” with no employees). Finally, Anderson asserts the trial court erred when it concluded he was an independent contractor when he was injured because there was no evidence supporting this conclusion.

We turn first to the question whether Hansa Meyer was a general contractor when it transported the demethanizer tower. We start with the statutory definition found in Section 406.121 of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Anderson relies entirely on the first sentence of the definition. The complete definition provides that

“General contractor” means a person who undertakes to procure the performance of work or a service, either separately or through the use of subcontractors. The term includes a “principal contractor,” “original contractor,” “prime contractor,” or other analogous term. The term does not include a motor carrier that provides a transportation service through the use of an owner operator.

Id. § 406.121(1). The statute defines “motor carrier” as “a person who operates a motor vehicle over a public highway in this state to provide a transportation service or who contracts to provide that service.” Id. § 406.121(3). The statute also defines “transportation service” as “providing a motor vehicle, with a driver under contract, to transport passengers or property.” Id. § 406.121(6). Finally, the statute defines “owner operator” as “a person who provides transportation services under contract for a motor carrier. An owner operator is an independent contractor.” Id. § 406.121(4). It is undisputed on appeal that Hansa Meyer was a motor carrier providing transportation services at all relevant times. The question on appeal thus becomes whether it did so through the use of an owner operator, such that the exclusion in the definition of “general contractor” applies to Hansa Meyer.

*5 The trial court found that Hansa Meyer was not a general contractor because it “provided some transportation services through the use of at least one owner-operator.” Anderson argues on appeal that the exclusion does not apply to Hansa Meyer because the evidence was undisputed that Hansa Meyer utilized its own tractor-trailer truck, pole car, and employee drivers. Anderson argues that, as a result, Hansa Meyer did not use an owner-operator to move the demethanizer tower. Anderson does not cite any case law in support of this argument, and we have found none.

We conclude that the definition of “owner operator” is not so narrow that it requires an owner operator to be operating the vehicle physically carrying the property at the time of injury. As Hansa Meyer argues, the statute’s plain text excludes a motor carrier that hires “an” owner operator—even just one—to provide “a” transportation service from the definition of general contractor. Tex. Lab. Code § 406.121(1). See City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. 2008) (“If the Legislature desires to amend the statute to add words so that the statute will then say what is contended for by the Estate, we are confident it will do so. However, changing the meaning of the statute by adding words to it, we believe, is a legislative function, not a judicial function.”); Jones v. Del Andersen & Assocs., 539 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Tex. 1976) (“[The intention of the Legislature] is to be found in the language of the statute itself … we cannot give Section 28 the limited construction advocated by Andersen. To do so would require that we read into the statute words which are not there.”).

While it is true the truck physically hauling the demethanizer tower belonged to Hansa Meyer and was driven by Hansa Meyer employees, it is also undisputed that Hansa Meyer was required to hire licensed peace officers to escort the oversized load. Therefore, the police escorts were a necessary part of the performance of Hansa Meyers’ contractual duty to transport the demethanizer tower. It is also undisputed that Hansa Meyer contracted with Anderson, who provided his own motorcycle, to provide the required police escort service. See Tex. Lab. Code § 406.121(4) (defining “owner operator” as a person who provides transportation services under contract for a motor carrier). Because the Workers’ Compensation Act does not limit the type of owner operator who can be retained by a motor carrier to perform transportation services, we conclude that Hansa Meyer fits within the exception to the definition of a general contractor. See Tex. Lab. Code § 406.121(6) (defining “transportation service” as providing a motor vehicle, with a driver under contract, to transport passengers or property). We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s conclusions of law that Hansa Meyer was not a general contractor, and that Anderson was not a subcontractor under Hansa Meyer. See Tex. Lab. Code § 406.121(1) (stating that the term “general contractor” does not include “a motor carrier that provides a transportation service through the use of an owner operator”).

Our determination is also supported by the principles of statutory construction summarized above. If we were to adopt Anderson’s argument that Section 406.123(b)’s reference to “general contractor” includes motor carriers, then the term “motor carrier” in Sections 406.122(a)¹ and 406.123(d)² would be superfluous, because motor carriers would already be covered by the inclusion of general contractors in both sections See Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 637 (Tex. 2010) (“Courts do not lightly presume that the Legislature may have done a useless act.” (internal quotations omitted)). Likewise, there would have been no need for the Legislature to separately allow motor carriers to extend coverage by agreement in Section 406.123(c), after the same authority had already been granted to general contractors in Section 406.123(a). Additionally, if the Legislature wanted to deem motor carriers to be the statutory employers of subcontractors without employees, it could easily have added the term “motor carrier” in Section 406.123(b), just as it did in Sections 406.122(a) and 406.123(d). Because the Legislature chose not to do so, we should not reach a decision which disregards this choice. See Tex. Law Shield LLP, 513 S.W.3d at 588 (stating that courts presume that any word not included in a statute “was purposefully not chosen”). Hansa Meyer therefore falls within the exclusion and is not a general contractor, and Anderson is not a deemed employee under Section 406.123(b).

*6 We further conclude the record evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion of law that Anderson was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because he was acting as an independent contractor for a motor carrier when he was injured, not an employee. See Tex. Lab. Code § 406.121(4). The Workers’ Compensation Act defines “independent contractor” as:

A person who contracts to perform work or provide a service for the benefit of another and who ordinarily:

(A) acts as the employer of the contractor by paying wage, directing activities, and performing other similar functions characteristic of an employer-employee relationship;

(B) is free to determine the manner in which the work or service is performed, including the hours of labor of or method of Payment to any employee;

(C) is required to furnish or to have the employees, if any, furnish necessary tools, supplies, or materials to perform the work or service; and

(D) possesses the skills required for the specific work or service.

Id. § 406.121(2). The Supreme Court independent contractor test asks whether the employer has the right to control the progress, details, and methods of operations of the work. Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc., 622 S.W.3d at 277.

Here, the evidence established that while Anderson had no employees, he functioned as his own employer because he selected the jobs he performed and decided how he would perform each job he accepted. In addition, Anderson worked for other trucking companies providing escorts, and Hansa Meyer did not limit those jobs. Further, Anderson had complete discretion on how he would carry out his police escort duties. In addition, Anderson was required to provide his own motorcycle, uniform, helmet, and gun belt. The only equipment provided by Hansa Meyer was a radio so Anderson could communicate with Hansa Meyer’s employees hauling the demethanizer tower. Finally, Anderson already possessed the skills and training he needed to carry out his duties as a police motorcycle escort. Anderson confirmed that Hansa Meyer offered him no training and did not tell him how to handle his responsibilities. Anderson was a licensed peace officer with more than twenty years of experience as a police officer and in directing traffic when he arrived the morning the movement of the demethanizer tower was to begin. We conclude that the record evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion of law that Anderson was acting as an independent contractor under both the statutory independent contractor definition and the Texas Supreme Court’s right of control test. Finally, if further support is necessary, the statute itself defines Anderson’s status when he was acting as an owner operator as an independent contractor. Tex. Lab. Code § 406.121(4) (“An owner operator is an independent contractor.”).

Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an independent contractor working for a motor carrier is not an employee of the motor carrier for purposes of workers’ compensation coverage unless the motor carrier has agreed in writing to provide its coverage to the contractor. See Tex. Lab. Code § 406.122(c). There is no evidence in the record of such an agreement. Because Anderson was an independent contractor working without a written agreement to be included in Hansa Meyer’s workers’ compensation insurance, he was not an employee of Hansa Meyer when he was injured and is therefore not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.

CONCLUSION

*7 Having overruled Anderson’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s final judgment.

Footnotes
1	Section 406.122(a)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act provides that for “purposes of workers’ compensation insurance coverage, a person who performs work or provides a service for a general contractor or motor carrier who is an employer under this subtitle is an employee of that general contractor or motor carrier, unless the person is: (1) operating as an independent contractor; ….” Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.122(a)(1).
2	Section 406.123(d) of the Workers’ Compensation Act provides that “[i]f a general contractor or a motor carrier elects to provide coverage under Subsection (a) or (c), then, notwithstanding Section 415.006, the actual premiums, based on payroll, that are paid or incurred by the general contractor or motor carrier for the coverage may be deducted from the contract price or other amount owed to the subcontractor or owner operator by the general contractor or motor carrier.” Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.123(d).