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At a Glance:
Title:
Amrhein v. United States
Date:
June 23, 2017
Citation:
4:16-CV-00223-ALM-CAN
Status:
Unpublished Opinion

Amrhein v. United States

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division.

Darlene C. AMRHEIN, Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16-CV-00223-ALM-CAN

|

Signed 06/23/2017

Attorneys & Firms

Darlene C. Amrhein, McKinney, TX, pro se.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Christine A. Nowak, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

*1 Plaintiff Darlene C. Amrhein filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Dkt. 4], which the Court provisionally granted [Dkt. 6], staying service of process and discovery in this case pending judicial screening of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court directed Plaintiff to file a “clear, succinct” amended complaint “filed in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Eastern District of Texas Local Rules” [Dkt. 6]. The Court specifically directed that the amended complaint must set forth “(1) [t]he basis for this Court’s jurisdiction over this litigation; (2) [e]ach claim/cause of action Plaintiff alleges or intends to allege[,] ... specifically identify[ing] which claims/causes of action are asserted against which Defendants in this litigation; [and] (3) [t]he specific factual allegations regarding each Defendant for each claim asserted” [Dkt. 6]. On November 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Petition / Pleadings from Original Petition with Stated Claims, Elements, Case Law & Specific Details as the Court Ordered & Pleads for Relief (“Amended Complaint”) [Dkt 11]. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is now before the Court for judicial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). After reviewing the Amended Complaint [Dkt. 11] and all other relevant filings, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint be DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

On March 31, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging multiple causes of action against numerous defendants stemming from prior alleged workplace mistreatment and related court proceedings [Dkt. 1]. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Dkt. 4], which the Court provisionally granted and then further directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint [Dkt. 6]. Plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint (the live pleading in this matter) on November 15, 2016 [Dkt. 11]. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint names over 160 defendants, namely her previous employer, certain insurance providers, various attorneys, judges, and judicial staff, and numerous governmental entities and agents (identified more fully infra ).

Plaintiff’s claims in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint originate from disputes between herself and her prior employer, La Madeleine, Inc. Plaintiff alleges La Madeleine and its employees mistreated her at work, caused her to suffer on-the-job injuries, and subsequently refused to pay for certain medical procedures Plaintiff attempted to claim under her employee insurance plan, among other things [see, e.g., Dkt. 11 at 1, 6-7, 11-13, 20, 29 (asserting claims against La Madeleine, Inc., other employees who worked with Plaintiff, and other entities allegedly associated with La Madeleine, Inc.) ]. Plaintiff raises claims related to the purported denial of insurance against certain insurance companies and their agents, as well as against certain physicians: Plaintiff asserts each of these persons and entities worked to deprive her of insurance benefits guaranteed through her employer [see, e.g., Dkt. 11 at 1-3, 6-7, 11-13]. Additionally, Plaintiff makes various allegations against lawyers, judges, and court staff associated with state court litigation she initiated in 1996 on these same claims and prosecuted unsuccessfully (through numerous appeals) for years [see Dkt. 11, Exhibits 18-24, 26-34,37-38]. See also, e.g., Amrhein v. La Madeleine, Inc. (Amrhein State ), No. 06-12-00107-CV, 2013 WL 839227, at *1 (Tex. App.— Texarkana, Mar. 6, 2013, pet. denied) (the state court case and appeals thereon are hereinafter and collectively referred to as the “Amrhein State litigation”).

*2 In the Amrhein State litigation, Plaintiff “initially sued La Madeleine, Inc., for failing to provide a safe workplace, alleging primarily that she developed carpal tunnel syndrome from the repetitive motion of tossing or mixing salads over a period of less than five months.” Amrhein State, 2013 WL 839227, at *1. After Plaintiff lost in the trial court (and following numerous appeals and remands), Plaintiff raised the following issues, among others, as bases for reversing the trial court’s unfavorable determination:

1) Abuse of Discretion, Arbitrarily Acts; No Reference to Guiding Legal Principles[;] 2) No Jurisdiction on state & federal claims; (ERISA, discriminations, defamation); 3) No Reinstatement from “2009 automatic bankruptcy stay” in case for jurisdiction; 4) Two Abatements refused, not heard & denied & refused authentications; 5) Denied discovery, abuses, no enforcement, sanctions abuses & secrecy of evidence; 6) Treating Appellant differently then Appellee, Exparate [sic] Communications –2 books; 7) Denied access to courts & elimination of court reporter record for Appeal; 8) Favoritism, secrecy, denied summary judgments & pandering for money-Judge Akin; 9) Denied hearings, settings, motions, evidence, 3 summary judgments & responses, objections, amended pleadings, deposition, affidavits, 62 causes of action as filed; 10) Negligence err decided no examination of complete 16 plus year record for ruling; 11) Gross Negligence is negligence, summary judgment motion contrary to order, errors; 12) Frauds, intents, retaliation, caused injuries, loss, damages & harm against Appellant; 13) Threats, harass, bias, discriminations, prejudice, conflict of interests (federal lawsuit); 14) No examination of record, no case knowledge, elimination & prevention of evidence; 15) Refuse correcting errors, orders, no service to prevent examination, unjust sanctions; 16) No “Due Process,” No Jury Trial (paid), 16 plus years litigation, 4 Appeals & costs; 17) Two Recusals, Unjust Sanctions, Incomplete Recusal Hearing, Invalid Order; 18) Cover up, conspiracy, intimidation, confusion, incompetence, multiple judges, errors; 19) Motion For New Trial denied, no hearing, violated state & federal laws, legislating from bench, witness tampering, violations of authority, licensing & oath of office; 20) Violations of 3 Appeal Orders, denied Constitutional Rights, filed evidence is more than scintilla of proof, arbitrary acts without guiding principles under color of law; 21) Invalid, vague Orders, missing records, decide Federal claims, frauds, no jurisdiction.

Id. at *1-2. The state appeals court described Plaintiff’s brief as “incomprehensible” and noted:

It can accurately be described as a fifty-page denunciation of perceived slights by the legal system and her belief that because she has not prevailed, the system has treated her unfairly at every turn. While the brief provides a list of the remaining causes of action of gross negligence, breach of implied contract, bad faith and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, conspiracy, fraudulent conduct, misrepresentations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (as well as a number of other causes of action not included in the live pleading), she has provided us with no analysis. Even though Amrhein states she has “96 Reasons” for reversal, the brief does not specify any evidence which would demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact was raised by Amrhein. Simply put, despite having a section labeled “argument,” her brief does not argue her position. The argument portion of the briefing relating to the grant of summary judgment to La Madeleine is missing.

*3 Id. at *2. The state appeals court concluded by affirming the state trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment against Plaintiff, issuing its opinion to that effect on March 6, 2013. The Texas Supreme Court denied review on February 7, 2014. Meanwhile, Plaintiff repeatedly filed for reconsideration and appeal in both courts until April 22, 2014, when the appeals court denied Plaintiff’s final motion. See Case record in Texas Court of Appeals Case No. 06-12-00107-CV.

While the Amrhein State litigation was ongoing, and on August 16, 2011, Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas; the Court transferred Plaintiff’s case to the Northern District of Texas on August 26, 2011. See Amrhein v. La Madeleine, Inc. (Amrhein NDTX I), No. 3:11-CV-02440-P, 2012 WL 12840376, (N.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2012), aff’d, 589 F. App’x 258 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (the proceedings before the Northern District of Texas and subsequent appeal to the Fifth Circuit are hereinafter referred to as the “Amrhein NDTX I litigation”). In the Amrhein NDTX I litigation, Plaintiff’s “employment dispute” the center of her claims in the Amrhein State litigation “grew into allegations against all branches of government for the State of Texas[,]” including sundry judges, their staff, legislators, and executive branch members. Id. at *1. Plaintiff also named as defendants in the Amrhein NDTX I litigation various attorneys allegedly involved in the Amrhein State litigation. Id. The Northern District dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, finding Plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted specifically because Plaintiff’s amended complaint failed to meet even the permissive federal pleading standard required of pro se litigants. See id. at *3-4.

In the instant action, Plaintiff now raises for the third time all of the same claims she raised in the Amrhein NDTX I litigation and, just as she did in that lawsuit, has appended claims against every member of the judiciary remotely associated with the Amrhein NDTX I litigation, as well as their staff and any attorney representing other parties to that litigation [see, e.g., Dkt. 11 at 1-4, 8-10]. Further, Plaintiff attempts to raise claims against various members of Congress, the federal executive branch, and every justice of the United States Supreme Court [see, e.g., Dkt. 11 at 9-10]. Plaintiff summarizes her claims as follows:

Plaintiff Amrhein work-related injuries by La Madeleine Inc., Fortis & Union Security Insurance, et al. Working, months of assaults, ignored 3 medical restrictions, threats, loss of pay, defame, slander & refused medical treatments. Required 4 operations for life-long disabilities. Denied Texas Worker’s Compensation as non-subscriber La Madeleine Inc.’s responsibilities. Refused active Long Term Disability Insurance Plan. Refused policy information to prevent Appeal. 1996 lawsuit filed timely into Texas & Federal Courts, but “no due process,” “no equal protection,” frequent injustices, violations of Constitutional Rights & Laws. Courts established “no jurisdiction, no hearings, no testimony, no examined evidence,” no court records & no transcripts as stored, missing & destroyed. Ignored U.S. Bankruptcy Stay Law caused for 10 years. No legal remedies, but invalid “void judgments,” cover up & conspiracy, while committing “Fraud Upon The Courts.” “Conflict of interest,” refused recusals & legal disqualifications. Presiding judges as Defendants ex-employees / friends used for their favorable Orders after “no examination of evidence & refused briefs on Appeal. La Madeleine Inc.’s engaged in frauds, exparte communications, influenced judges, refused discovery, no service & no court access. Defendants committed “Fraud Upon The Courts,” denied: filings, no jury trial & appearance of bribe. Protection by Judges & Justices contrary to settled laws, caused additional injuries & various damages. Evidence, court records, discriminations, bias, prejudice, retaliation, tricks, surprise, cover up, abuses, conspiracy, judicial misconduct & intimidations by illegal use of sanctions for 20 years & “no legal remedies for assaults & injuries. Use of Frauds, unjust enrichments, “Fraud Upon Courts” by multiple misconducts, illegal activities violated Texas & United States Constitutional Rights. Federal Officials & all Courts did “nothing” about known intentional injustices. Plaintiff informed to file lawsuit by the United States Department of Justice against “United States of America” for all violations & injustices.

*4 [Dkt. 11 at 1-2 (errors and phrasing in original) ]. In short, Plaintiff claims conspiracies, frauds, and biased judges who worked with attorneys representing other parties (as well as many entities and members of the federal and Texas state governments) caused her damages because, she perceives, her claims have not received a fair shake in court. These claims, as well as her underlying claims related to her employment with La Madeleine and its alleged termination and/or denial of Plaintiff’s insurance benefits, have already been dismissed by the state courts and the Northern District of Texas and now are before the Eastern District of Texas for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Before turning to its analysis, the Court notes Plaintiff has filed more than six suits in the Texas state and federal courts, and each of these cases has been dismissed for frivolousness and/or for failure to comply with basic pleading or procedural requirements. See, e.g., Amrhein State, 2013 WL 839227; Amrhein NDTX I, 2012 WL 12840376; Balistreri v. Remax Realty, No. 05-10-00611-CV, 2011 WL 149984, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 19, 2011, pet. denied); Balistreri-Amrhein v. AHI, No. 05-09-01377-CV, 2012 WL 3100775, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 6, 2011, pet denied); Amrhein-Macon v. Wood, No. 2-05-158-CV, 2005 WL 1654762, at *1 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth July 14, 2005), cert. denied 549 U.S. 916; Amrhein v. Riechert, No. 3:12-CV-03707-G-BK, 2013 WL 1155473, at *13-14 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:12-CV-3707-G BK, 2013 WL 1174571 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2013) (Amrhein NDTX II); Balistreri-Amrhein v. Verrilli, No. 4:16-CV-112, 2017 WL 726919, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2017). In each of Plaintiff’s cases, she has filed flurries of largely incomprehensible motions, letters, and other requests for relief both prior to and following the respective court’s disposition of her claims, resulting in her being deemed by other courts as a vexatious litigant.

To that end, in one of Plaintiff’s prior suits before the Northern District, the Northern District court evaluated Plaintiff’s litigation history and determined entry of a pre-filing injunction was merited. The Pre-Filing Injunction reads as follows:

Darlene Amrhein is prohibited from filing any new civil action in any United States district court unless she first files a motion requesting leave of court to do so and attaches thereto copies of (1) her proposed complaint, (2) the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions and recommendation in this case, (3) this court’s order accepting the findings, conclusions and recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, and (4) the judgment in this case.

Amrhein NDTX II, 2013 WL 1155473, at *13-14; report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:12-CV-3707-G BK, 2013 WL 1174571 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2013) (hereinafter the “Pre-Filing Injunction”). This Court has also recently examined Plaintiff’s prolific filing history and Plaintiff’s continued and repeated failure to comply with the Northern District of Texas Pre-Filing Injunction. See Balistreri-Amrhein, No. 4:16-cv-112, 2017 WL 726919, at *5-6 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2017) (hereinafter “Amrhein EDTX I”).1

LEGAL STANDARD

A district court has authority to dismiss sua sponte a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the court finds that the complaint filed “[1] is frivolous or malicious; [2] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or [3] seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Potts v. Texas, 354 F. App’x 70, 71 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“The district court shall dismiss a case filed IFP at any time if the complaint is frivolous or malicious.”) (citing Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997) ). A court, however, must liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings in analyzing those pleadings under Section 1915(e). See Flanagan v. LaGrone, No. 9:16-CV-00059-MHS, 2016 WL 4163557, at *1 (E.D. Tex. July 6, 2016) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) ); see also Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 1976) (explaining that, in the pro se context, Haines v. Kerner modifies the typical Section 1915(e) standard of review for legal sufficiency).

*5 Under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), courts must evaluate a complaint filed in forma pauperis for frivolousness or maliciousness. Cases “duplicative of a pending or previous lawsuit” are malicious. Potts, 354 F. App’x at 71 (citing Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993) and Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988) ); see also McBarron v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 332 F. App’x 961, 963-64 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“The majority of ... claims involved the same general series of events, facts, and conditions that were at issue in an earlier ... proceeding[ ] and therefore constituted ‘[r]epetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action’ that were properly dismissed as malicious.”). This is so even where the plaintiff “raise[s] new claims,” so long as those claims “grow out of the same allegations” as were presented in the prior or pending suit(s). Id.; see also Potts v. Texas, No. 1:07-CV-632, 2008 WL 4525007, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2008) (“While there may be some new defendants and claims buried within the original and two amended complaints filed in this district, the new factual allegations are the same ‘clearly baseless,’ ‘fanciful,’ ... types of claims that were dismissed as frivolous in [plaintiff’s previous cases].”). A court may dismiss a case either as malicious or as frivolous for being duplicative. See Silva v. Stickney, No. 3:03-cv-2279-D, 2005 WL 2445433, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2005) (“Courts may appropriately dismiss an in forma pauperis action as frivolous, when the action ‘seek[s] to relitigate claims which allege substantially the same facts arising from a common series of events which have already been unsuccessfully litigated by the IFP plaintiff.’ ” (quoting Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1989) ) ); see also Yarborough v. Sheriff, Tarrant Cty., Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-207-Y, 2011 WL 4736302, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex, Oct. 5, 2011) (Claims presented that “are duplicative of claims already asserted and dismissed in [a] previous case ... may be dismissed as frivolous or malicious[,]” or, “[a]lternatively, [because they] are ... barred by the doctrine of res judicata[.]”).

Further, claims without an arguable basis in law or fact are also frivolous. See, e.g., Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing factual and legal frivolousness). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law where the complaint “is grounded upon an untenable, discredited, or indisputably meritless legal theory, including alleged violations of a legal interest that clearly does not exist.” Brown v. Allen, No. 3:16-cv-214-N-BN, 2016 WL 2855581, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2016) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989) ); see also Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing that the claim must truly lack merit, such as where the defendant has immunity to suit). In examining claims for legal frivolousness, courts may reject wholly conclusory claims, Bilbrew v. Johnson, 239 F. App’x 49, 50 (5th Cir. 2007), or those that fail arguably to comply with the prescribed pleading standard requiring a short and plain statement demonstrating entitlement to relief, Harris v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 680 F.2d 1109, 1110 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). In like manner, when screening for factual frivolousness a court need not “accept without question the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations[,]” even where the allegations “cannot be rebutted by judicially noticeable facts.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Instead, if the complaint’s “factual contentions are clearly baseless”—such as “claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios” or situations that are “wholly incredible”—the court may sua sponte dismiss. Id. (internal quotations omitted).

A court also must determine whether any claims not deemed frivolous or malicious “fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or else “seek[ ] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii). The immunity inquiry generally folds into the frivolousness analysis. Cf. Booker, 2 F.3d at 116 (“A claim against a defendant who is immune from suit is frivolous because it is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory.”). But a defendant’s immunity acts as an independent basis for Section 1915(e) dismissal where a plaintiff seeks monetary damages from such defendant. See Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d 75, 76-77 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Likewise, the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim may alone serve as a basis for dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Pleasant v. Sinz, No. 9:15-CV-00166-MHS, 2016 WL 4613359, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2016). In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and in contrast to the frivolousness analysis, a court must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007). The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish plausible, rather than merely conceivable, claims to relief in order to survive such scrutiny. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Claims are “facial[ly] plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged[,]” i.e., “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). By contrast, claims are “implausible on [their] face when ‘the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’ ” Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

PRE-FILING INJUNCTION

*6 The Court notes initially that Plaintiff has yet again violated the Pre-Filing Injunction entered by the Northern District of Texas in filing this lawsuit. See Amrhein NDTX II, 2013 WL 1174571, at *1. By Order of the Northern District of Texas, Plaintiff is required to file a Motion for Leave prior to filing any lawsuit in any federal court, attaching the following: (1) the proposed complaint; (2) the Amrhein NDTX II opinion, (3) the Pre-Filing Injunction, and (4) the judgments in Amrhein NDTX II. See id. Although Plaintiff references the underlying state actions and the Amrhein NDTX I litigation in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff failed to file the requisite motion for leave (or any of the required attachments) prior to filing the instant suit. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Order of the Northern District of Texas alone is sufficient to justify dismissal of Plaintiff’s live pleading, the Amended Complaint. See, e.g., Potts, 354 F. App’x at 71 (“A district court may bar a vexatious litigant from filing future ... complaints unless she seeks the prior approval of a district or magistrate judge.”) (citing Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1994) ).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has named over one hundred sixty defendants. Accordingly, for purposes of clarity, the Court has grouped the defendants into three groups as follows: (1) the Northern District of Texas Defendants,2 (2) the Related Defendants,3 and (3) the Federal Lawsuit Defendants.4 To the extent the Court has inadvertently omitted any named defendant in the lists included herein, the Court clarifies that this Report and Recommendation addresses all named defendants and all claims raised by Plaintiff in her Amended Complaint.

I. Northern District of Texas Defendants and Related Defendants: Plaintiff’s Suit is Wholly Duplicative of the Amrhein NDTX I and Amrhein State Litigation

*7 Turning first to the Northern District of Texas Defendants and the Related Defendants, Plaintiff raises the same or substantially similar claims against these Defendants in this case (or those similarly situated) as Plaintiff raised in the Amrhein NDTX I litigation [compare Dkt. 11, with Amrhein NDTX I, 2012 WL 12840376]. Indeed, Plaintiff’s claims before this Court wholly duplicate those claims Plaintiff raised before the Northern District of Texas and are, therefore, subject to dismissal under Section 1915(e) as malicious and/or frivolous. The Northern District of Texas summarized the claims Plaintiff raised before that Court as follows:

This case involves an employment dispute that grew into allegations against all branches of government for the State of Texas. Defendant La Madeleine, Inc. (“La Madeleine”) employed Plaintiff from August 1994 to February 1996. (Doc. 1, p–12) On August 29, 1994, Plaintiff sued La Madeleine in state court. (Doc. 103, p. 5) Plaintiff avers that she litigated this dispute in Texas state court—both at the trial and appellate levels—for over fourteen years. (Id. at 10).

After exhausting her options in state court, Plaintiff turned to the federal system. On August 16, 2011, proceeding pro se, Plaintiff filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas, alleging numerous constitutional and statutory violations against La Madeleine as well as various state entities and officials. (Doc. 1, pp. 20-22) On August 26, 2011, the lawsuit was transferred to the Northern District of Texas. (Doc. 61) On April 5, 2012, Plaintiff moved to supplement her pleadings. (Doc. 73) On May 10, 2012, Plaintiff moved to join several indispensable parties. (Doc. 75) On May 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint, (Doc. 78) After a series of motions to dismiss, on July 17, 2012, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 87) On that same day, Plaintiff moved to join four other indispensable parties. (Doc. 88) After a series of motions to dismiss and without a ruling on her motion for leave, on August 10, 2012, Plaintiff moved to file a Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. 98) Without an order granting leave, on August 24, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint totaling over 200 pages. (Doc. 102) Six days later, Plaintiff moved to supplement the Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. 103) Thereafter, Defendants filed a flurry of motions to strike these pleadings. (Docs. 106, 109).

...

Liberally construing Plaintiffs third attempt to satisfy the federal pleadings standards, Plaintiff fails to state claims for relief on all grounds asserted. Wading through 200 pages of pleadings and supplementary filings, Plaintiff vents general frustration toward the legal process in state court and then—defendant-by-defendant—lists all causes of action that she pursues against each entity. (See Docs. 102, 103) The pleadings did not discuss elements and fail to link specific facts to the asserted actions. Plaintiff concludes by requesting relief for injuries that seem nebulous without facts to demonstrate actual harm. To the extent that legally relevant facts are present, there is nothing to connect an unsuccessful foray in state court to the litany of claims now championed in the Third Amended Complaint. In Plaintiff’s third effort, it is still unclear how these under-pled vague facts rise up and create a right to recover in law or equity.

Amrhein NDTX I, 2012 WL 12840376, at *1, 3, aff’d F. App’x 258. As such, the Northern District found Plaintiff’s claims against each of the Northern District of Texas Defendants failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, noted Plaintiff’s apparent frustration with the litigation process, and concluded Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice. Id. at *4.

*8 In like manner, here, Plaintiff states her claims before the Court over the course of thirty largely incomprehensible, rambling, single-spaced pages, alleging numerous violations by the Northern District of Texas Defendants and the Related Defendants of various state and federal statutory and constitutional provisions, such as the “Due Process Clause,” “RICO,” and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), among many others5 [see Dkt. 11]. Plaintiff sues every Northern District of Texas Defendant and every Related Defendant for these violations individually and under the theory of respondeat superior. The allegations against each of the Northern District of Texas Defendants and the Related Defendants relate (often quite tangentially) to the employment and insurance issues Plaintiff alleges she experienced and the subsequent proceedings in the underlying state actions. Moreover, Plaintiff presents her allegations in a disorderly manner with no concrete allegations of wrongdoing. Plaintiff’s claims in this suit and the legal vehicles through which Plaintiff attempts to bring them—respondeat superior, Title VII, RICO—mirror the claims Plaintiff raised before the Northern District of Texas. Compare Amrhein NDTX I, 2012 WL 12840376, with Dkt. 11. The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff’s claims in the Amended Complaint merely duplicate the claims raised before the Northern District in the Amrhein NDTX I litigation. And in those instances where Plaintiff raises new claims against either Related Defendants or Northern District of Texas Defendants, those new factual allegations/claims are the same clearly baseless types of claims that were dismissed for failure to state a claim in the Northern District. See Potts, 2008 WL 425007, at *3 (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325-27). Accordingly, each and every one of the claims asserted by Plaintiff against the Northern District of Texas Defendants and the Related Defendants must be dismissed under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as frivolous and malicious for duplicating her previously dismissed claims. Potts, 354 F. App’x at 71; Pittman, 980 F.2d at 995; Bailey, 846 F.2d at 1021.

II. The Federal Lawsuit Defendants

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also raises claims against various judges, judicial staff, and federal and state executive and legislative entities and agents who Plaintiff alleges were somehow involved with the Amrhein NDTX I litigation [Dkt. 11]. Plaintiff alleges therein that each of the Federal Lawsuit Defendants engaged in bias, discrimination, and retaliation, as well as either judicial or attorney misconduct or outright omission and/or failure to act while participating either directly or indirectly in the Amrhein NDTX I litigation. These allegations have not previously been asserted, as they arise wholly from the district and appeals proceedings in the Amrhein NDTX I litigation. Accordingly, the Court screens these claims for “fail[ure] to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or for “seeking monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief[,]” rather than strictly for maliciousness or frivolousness. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii). The Court further defines the following sub-groups of the Federal Lawsuit Defendants in order to more efficiently analyze Plaintiff’s many claims against the Federal Lawsuit Defendants: (A) Defendant Judges and Courts, (B) Defendant Court Staff and Clerks, (C) Defendant Attorneys and Law Firms, and (D) Government Defendants.

A. Defendant Judges and Courts

Plaintiff alleges variously that the Defendant Judges and Courts engaged in “bias, prejudice, retaliation” towards Plaintiff and that these Defendants were unfamiliar with Plaintiff’s case and refused to recuse themselves in Plaintiff’s proceedings before each [e.g., Dkt. 11 at 11]. Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant Judges and Courts are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Judges generally have absolute immunity for judicial actions taken within the scope of their jurisdiction, which also means judicial officers are generally immune from suits for money damages. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam); Davis v. Tarrant Cty., 565 F.3d 214, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2009). “Judicial immunity can be overcome only by showing that the actions complained of were nonjudicial in nature or by showing that the actions were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994). “A judge’s acts are judicial in nature if they are normally performed by a judge and the parties affected dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id. at 285 (internal quotation marks omitted). But “judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice,” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, and “[d]isagreeing with a judge’s actions does not justify depriving that judge of his or her immunity,” Greenlee v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 09–2243–cv–FJG, 2009 WL 1424514, at *2 (D. Kan. May 21, 2009) (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 363).

*9 Here, Plaintiff’s claims against each of the Defendant Judges and Courts relate to those Defendants’ actions as judges; Plaintiff has not alleged or shown that any of the Defendant Judges took actions outside the scope of his or her work as a judge [e.g., Dkt. 11 at 11]. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges as follows:

Defendants Courts, Judges Justices, Attorneys & Clerks, et al. allowed “Fraud Upon Courts” by establishing: no jurisdiction, no hearings, no direct testimony from “fact witnesses,” no filed evidence accepted before Courts, “no unbias trier of facts,” no enforcement of Civil Rules & Procedures, no fairness, “no due process,” No Justice to correct outcome for 20 years. Plaintiff Amrhein did receive “conflict of interest,” denied Constitutional Rights, denied Laws, refused U.S. Bankruptcy Laws & Stay, refused recusal motions on “automatic disqualified” judges, threats, perjury, eliminated & refused court records denied briefing for Appeals, “no service,” & paid court costs. Bias, Prejudice, Silence, Retaliation, Exparte Communications, Omissions, Corruption, Collusion, Misconduct, Mistakes, Fraud, Malice, Trickery, Conspiracy, Destruction of Evidence, No Access to Courts & Manipulation ends with “void judgments,” no valid Appeals, against Rule of Law, Texas Constitution & our United States Constitution. Refusing customary legal standards & “equal protection” is basis for this lawsuit & denied all “legal remedies” for injuries caused by these Defendants, favors for friends, which requires “redress” as directed by United States Department of Justice to sadly sue “United States of America” restitution.

[Dkt. 11 at 11].

Each of Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant Judges appear to allege misconduct in connection with the hearing of Plaintiff’s claims or appeals in the Amrhein NDTX I litigation and/or investigation of complaints of judicial misconduct by other judges. All of these acts fall within the purview of “judicial acts,” and are accordingly absolutely barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Oliver v. Trial Court Judges, No. 3:15-CV-2962-P-BN, 2015 WL 6438477, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2015), rec. adopted, No. 3:15-CV-2962-P, 2015 WL 6460030 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2015) (dismissing claims against judges based on judicial immunity). Further, because Plaintiff’s claims against the various state and federal courts (e.g., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit) allege substantially the same claims as against the individual Defendant Judges, such claims against the Courts are also barred by judicial immunity. See Brown v. Supreme Court of La., No. CIV.A. 88-3255, 1988 WL 137486, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 1988) (dismissing claims against “Louisiana Supreme Court (and its judges)” based on judicial immunity). Moreover, Plaintiff fails to allege any concrete facts that might tie any particular Defendant Judge or Court to the alleged wrongdoing—i.e., her Amended Complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“In keeping with these principles a court ... can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). Accordingly, the Court finds each of Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant Judges and Courts should be dismissed pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. Defendant Court Staff and Clerks

*10 Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant Court Staff and Clerks are likewise barred by immunity. The Fifth Circuit has held that court clerks “have absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge’s discretion.” Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); see Kasterner v. Lawrence, 390 F. App’x 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2010). The present case clearly is apposite.

Plaintiff makes the same factual allegations against the Defendant Court Staff and Clerks as quoted supra at Section II.A. (against the Defendant Judges and Courts) [see generally Dkt. 11]. Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant Court Staff and Clerks seemingly seek to attribute every loss or negative action in the Amrhein NDTX I litigation to the federal clerk and/or office for the court in which the action was taken. To the extent the actions or harms alleged resulted from a judicial order or court ruling (e.g., dismissal of the lawsuit, denial of IFP status, or requirement to pay filing fees), the Defendant Court Staff and Clerks are protected by absolute immunity. Clay, 242 F.3d at 682. Furthermore, and like with the Defendant Judges and Court, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to raise a claim upon which relief may be granted against the Defendant Court Staff and Clerks. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Accordingly, the Court finds that each of Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant Court Staff and Clerks should be dismissed pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

C. Defendant Attorneys and Law Firms

Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant Attorneys and Law Firms are likewise barred by immunity and fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As with the Defendant Court Staff and Clerks, Plaintiff relies on the same conclusory allegations quoted supra at Section II.A (against the Defendant Judges and Courts). Plaintiff’s claims against each of the Defendant Attorneys and Law Firms relate to the Attorney Defendants’ conduct while representing one or more parties in the Amrhein NDTX I litigation [see generally Dkt. 11]. Plaintiff’s claims are each raised against an attorney who represented some other party: Plaintiff proceeded pro se throughout the Northern District of Texas Action.

In Texas, “attorney immunity”—an attorney’s defense to claims by non-clients in association with the attorney’s actions in representing a client in litigation—is properly characterized as a true immunity from suit, not as a defense to liability. Troice v. Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., 816 F.3d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 2016); Sorey v. Kellett, 849 F.2d 960, 962 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481-84 (Tex. 2015). The doctrine “ ‘stem[s] from the broad declaration ... that “attorneys are authorized to practice their profession, to advise their clients and interpose any defense or supposed defense, without making themselves liable for damages.” ’ ” Troice, 816 F.3d at 346 (quoting Cantey Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at 481-84 (Tex. 2015) ). This doctrine ensures attorneys advocate zealously—“loyal[ly], faithful[ly], and aggressive[ly]”— for their clients. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Attorney immunity is necessary “to avoid the inevitable conflict that would arise if [an attorney] were ‘forced constantly to balance his own potential exposure against his client’s best interest.’ ” Id. at 483 (quoting Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, PC, 178 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) ). As the Texas Supreme Court recently clarified, fraud is no exception to attorney immunity. Cantey Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at 483-84.

*11 Here, as noted supra (and as best the Court can discern), Plaintiff raises claims against Defendant Attorneys based solely on action those Defendants took while representing other parties. Because Plaintiff alleges acts committed solely during these attorneys’ representation of their respective clients, Texas’s doctrine of attorney immunity absolutely bars Plaintiff’s claims. Troice, 816 F.3d at 345-49 (reversing and remanding for entry of judgment in favor of attorneys based on attorney immunity, where plaintiff asserted claims against counsel for another party in a court action). And again, Plaintiff’s bare bones allegations against these Defendants do not muster sufficient facts to support Plaintiff’s legal conclusions regarding liability. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Accordingly, the Court finds that each of Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant Attorneys and Law Firms should be dismissed pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

D. Government Defendants

As noted supra, a complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish plausible claims to relief in order to survive under the federal pleading standards. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; FED. R. CIV. P. 8. When determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, a court must (1) identify the complaint’s conclusory allegations and disregard them, then (2) evaluate the remaining allegations for plausibility. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-80.

In the present case, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not proceed past step one. Plaintiff alleges only that she “Reported & Disclosed” to or filed complaints with the various Government Defendants, and seemingly that these “[c]omplaints were met by silence, no assistance, no explanations & ‘no remedies’ ” [Dkt. 11 at 11]. These allegations do not assert any cognizable legal claim and, in any event, provide no factual underpinnings on which to rest such claims. Plaintiff simply fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim here, as it is unclear to what “complaints” Plaintiff even refers. Accordingly, the Court finds that each of Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant Attorneys and Law Firms should similarly be dismissed pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court finds first that Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit in violation of the Pre-filing Injunction. The Court further finds that each of Plaintiff’s claims against the Northern District of Texas Defendants and Related Defendants are frivolous and malicious, and should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Finally, the Court finds that each of Plaintiff’s claims against the Federal Lawsuit Defendants should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [Dkt. 11] and each and every of the claims therein be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Within fourteen (14) days after service of the magistrate judge’s report, any party must serve and file specific written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific.

*12 Failure to file specific, written objections will bar the party from appealing the unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).

Footnotes

1

Plaintiff requested reconsideration of the Court’s findings and disposition of her claims in Amrhein EDTX I, which the Court rejected on April 24, 2017. See Eastern District of Texas Case No. 4:16-cv-112, Dkt. 137. Plaintiff responded by filing an additional motion seeking reconsideration of the Court’s denial of her previous motion for reconsideration. Eastern District of Texas Case No. 4:16-cv-112, Dkt. 138.

2

In the Amrhein NDTX I litigation, Plaintiff named the following entities and persons, alleging each was directly or indirectly involved in the employment-related matters or engaged in some misconduct or bias in adjudicating or litigating the underlying state actions: La Madeleine, Inc., State Bar of Texas; Governor Rick Perry, Texas Attorney General (then Gregg Abbott), Texas Secretary of State (then Hope Andrade), Texas State Legislature, Dallas County, John F. Warren (County Clerk and Records), Dallas Texas Courts & Judges (specifically, County Court at Law No. 3, Judge Sally Montgomery, County Court at Law No. 1, Judge D’Metria Benson, and Judge Ted Akin, as well as “All Court[s] & Judges” in the George L. Allen Building), the Regional Administrative Court, Judge John Ovard, the County Court at Law Fifth District of Texas, the Supreme Court of Texas, Attorney Jerry Fazio, Owen & Fazio Law Firm, Attorney Brent Cornwell, Attorney Robert Clarkson, Judge Jack Pierce, Judge Russell Roden, Judge Robert Jenevein, Union Security Insurance Company, Michelle Falen, the Texas Department of Insurance, and the Texas Insurance Commissioner. These defendants are hereinafter and collectively referred to as “the Northern District of Texas Defendants.” Plaintiff already have pursued claims against each of these defendants in the Amrhein NDTX I litigation that have previously been dismissed.

3

Plaintiff names the following entities and persons in the Amended Complaint, alleging each was directly or indirectly involved in the employment-related matters or engaged in some misconduct or bias in adjudicating or litigating the underlying state actions: La Madeleine of Texas, Inc., La Madeleine, de Corps, Inc., Groupe Le Duffe, Inc., Patrick Leon Esquerre (Founder, Owner, Advisor & Seller), Mr. John Corcoran (President/CEO), John Cahill (President), Duncan Davis (Vice President), Wallace B. Doolin (CEO), Fortis Benefits Insurance Company & Agents, Assurant Employee Benefits, Occupational Health (La Madeleine Company Healthcare Provider), Dr. John Touhey (Company Physician & Reporting Agent), Gwynn Carver, M.D. (Company Physician & Drug Testing), Mark S. Hutzel (La Madeleine Operations & Direct Manager), Karen Gentry (La Madeleine Employee & Supervisor), Sharon Crane (La Madeleine Employee & Long Term Disability Insurance), Steve Roos (La Madeleine Employee Corporate Office), “Other La Madeleine Employees Witnesses – Becky, Monique, Judith, Carlos, et al.,” Essilor Vision Foundation, Esquerre Enterprises, Le Madeleine (Florida) Inc., La Madeleine Boca Raton, The Wine Gourmet, Inc., Holder Services, Inc., LMI Investment #1 Company LTD, Esquerre Property Company LTD, Attorney John Owen, Attorney Tracy Stoker, Dodge, Fazio, Anderson & Jones, Attorney Jason Kipness, Kipness Law Firm, Attorney S. Russell Headrick, Lathrop & Gage, LLP, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Attorney Erika M. Kane, Attorney Peter Harlan, Attorney Michael James Patterson, Attorney Cynthia Canfield Hamilton, Attorney Susan Farris, Law Offices of Gallerson & Yates, Vincent, Sarafino, Geary, Waddell & Jenevein, Attorney David R. Gibson, The Gibson Group, Judge Mark Greenberg, Attorney Michael R. Snipes (Retired Judge), Broden, Mickelsen, Helms, & Snipes LLP, Judge Bill F. Coker, Judge Tom Fuller, Judge Mary Murphy, Bailiff Gary Christensen, Dallas Sheriff’s Department Lt. Dohmann, Dallas County Sheriff Department Lupe Valdez, Dallas County Internal Affairs/Bailiffs, Lt. B. Terrell Internal Affairs Dallas Sheriff’s Department, Cheryl Duncan (Transcription Reporter), Cayse Coskey (Court Reporter), Richard Rhode (Court Reporter), Fawn Cave (Court Reporter), Denise Jay (Court Reporter), Veronica Hood, Aneesah Anderson, Court Chief Deputy Claudia McCoy, Court Clerk Lisa Matz, Fifth District Court of Appeals at Dallas, Justice Joseph Morris, Justice Mark Whittington, Justice Michael O’Neill, Justice Carolyn Wright, Justice Elizabeth Lang-Miers, Justice Martin Richter, Justice Douglas Lang, Justice Linda Thomas, Justice David Bridges, Justice Kerry P. Fitzgerald, Sixth District Court of Appeals at Texarkana, Justice Josh R. Morriss III, Justice Jack Carter, and Justice Bailey Moseley. These defendants are hereinafter and collectively referred to as “the Related Defendants.” Plaintiff raises claims against each of these defendants related to the same underlying facts as were raised in Amrhein NDTX I and, as best the Court can tell, does so for the first time in the present case.

4

Plaintiff also names the following entities and persons in the Amended Complaint, alleging that each was either directly or indirectly involved in and acting unlawfully with regard to the Amrhein NDTX I litigation: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (“Judge Don Bush Venue Transfer 2011”), United States Northern District Court, Judge Jorge Solis, Magistrate Judge Renee Toliver, Judge A. Joe Fish, Clerk of Court Karen Mitchell (Northern District), Chief Judge Carl E. Stewart, Shelly Saltzman (Fifth Circuit), United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit, Judge Thomas Reavely, Judge Leslie H. Southwick, Judge James L. Dennis, Clerk of Court Lyle W. Cayce, United States Supreme Court & Justices; Justice Sonia Maria Sotomayor; Justice Stephen Gerald Breyer; Justice Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr.; Justice Elena Kagan; Justice Clarence Thomas; Justice Antonin Gregory Scalia (Deceased); Justice Anthony McLeod Kennedy; Justice Ruth Joan Bader Ginsburg; Chief Justice John G. Roberts; Clerk Advisor Jacob C. Travers; Supreme Court Clerks Scott S. Harris and James Atkinson, United States of America; President Barack Hussein Obama, Vice President Joseph Biden, United States Solicitor General Donald B. Verilli, Jr., United States Attorney General Loretta Elizabeth Lynch, United States Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas; John R. Parker (Northern District); Malcolm Bales (U.S. Attorney’s Office); Federal Bureau of Investigation; FBI Director James B. Comey; United States Senate Judiciary Committee; Judiciary Senate Chairman Charles E. “Chuck” Grassley, United States House Judiciary Committee; Judiciary House Chairman Robert Bob Goodlatte; Ted Cruz (U.S. Senator and Senate Judicial Chairman), John Cornyn (U.S. Senator and Senate Judicial Committee); United States Senate (114th Congress), United States House (114th Congress); Administrative Office of United States Courts, Office of General Counsel, United States Attorneys Office (Malcolm Bale), Texas Office of Court Administration, Dan Patrick (Texas Lt. Governor), Texas Ethics Commission, Texas Workers Compensation Division, Robert Shipe & Richard F. Reynolds, Texas Senate; Texas Senate Members, City of Dallas, Mayor of Dallas Mike Rawlings, Dallas County Judge Clay Jenkins, Dallas City Hall, Dallas County District Attorney’s Office (Susan Hawk), and Dallas City Council & Members. These defendants are hereinafter and collectively referred to as “the Federal Lawsuit Defendants.” Plaintiff attempts to raise claims against each of these defendants that are in some manner related to the Amrhein NDTX I litigation.

5

Plaintiff purports to claim recovery through at least thirty different statutes and causes of action [Dkt. 11 at i.-ii.]. Plaintiff asserts no facts in connection with such statutes. In most instances, she merely lists or includes citations to these statutes and/or causes of action in the body of the Amended Complaint.

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