United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division.

JAMES RAY BATTLE, JR., Plaintiff,

v.

MATTHEWS NISSAN OF PARIS, Defendant.

CIVIL NO. 4:24-CV-00527-ALM-AGD

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Filed 08/22/2025

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

AILEEN GOLDMAN DURRETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

*1 Because the court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and because pro se Plaintiff James Ray Battle Jr. has failed to prosecute this case or comply with the court’s orders, the court recommends that this case be dismissed without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

On May 16, 2024, Plaintiff initiated the instant lawsuit by filing a Complaint in the Northern District of Texas (Dkt. #1). On June 12, 2024, the case was transferred to the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division (Dkt. #5). The same day, this case was referred to the undersigned (Dkt. #6). On March 26, 2025, the court ordered Plaintiff to, “within 30 days of receipt of this Order, either pay the requisite filing fee or submit an application to proceed in forma pauperis.” (Dkt. #7). On April 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Make Payment (Dkt. #8). On April 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Dkt. #9). On April 21, 2025, the court ordered Plaintiff to, no later than May 16, 2025, “file an Amended Complaint setting forth: (1) The basis for this court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this litigation; (2) The claim(s) asserted against Defendant; (3) The factual allegations for each claim asserted; and (4) The relief sought.” (Dkt. #10). The Order also contained the following language: “Failure to comply with this Order may result in a recommendation of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).” (Dkt. #10) (emphasis omitted). The same day, the court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, ordered Plaintiff to pay the initial partial filing fee of $12.00 within 30 days and denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time as moot (Dkt. #11). To date, Plaintiff has not filed an Amended Complaint, paid the initial partial filing fee, or otherwise participated in the lawsuit.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3)

Subject-matter jurisdiction in a federal court can be established in two ways: federal question or diversity. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Federal question jurisdiction includes “all civil actions arising under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Diversity jurisdiction is established when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00 and the matter is between “(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state … ; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state … as plaintiff and citizens of a State or different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

The court will accept as true all well-pleaded allegations set forth in the complaint and construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Truman v. U.S., 26 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1994). As such, “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction ….” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); Magana v. Hammer & Steel, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 2d 848, 850 (S.D. Tex. 2002). Once a defendant files a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and challenges jurisdiction, the party invoking jurisdiction has the burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980). Federal courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)). When a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).

*2 It is true that “parties who proceed pro se are often given more leeway than represented parties in correcting errors in pleadings,” and “a court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, taking all well-pleaded allegations as true.” Simmons. Methodist Hosps. of Dallas, 106 F. Supp. 3d 799, 803; Fields v. Lackey, No. 4:16-CV-607, 2018 WL 3018869, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 18, 2018). However, “pro se litigants are [still] expected to comply with the rules of pleading.” Simmons, 106 F. Supp. 3d at 803. Also, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint “must set forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief may be granted.” Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)

A district court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or to comply with any court order. Campbell v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b)). The exercise of the power to dismiss for failure to prosecute is committed to the sound discretion of the court, and appellate review is confined solely to whether the court abused its discretion. Green v. Forney Eng’g Co., 589 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted); Lopez v. Aransas Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). “Not only may a district court dismiss for want of prosecution upon motion of a defendant, but it may also sua sponte dismiss an action whenever necessary to ‘achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’ ” Anthony v. Marion Cnty. Gen. Hosp., 617 F.2d 1164, 1167 (5th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

At the outset, the court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of jurisdictional allegations (Dkt. #3). Moreover, on April 21, 2025, the court ordered Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint that established the basis for this court’s jurisdiction (Dkt. #10). As discussed, infra, Plaintiff failed to amend his Complaint, and thus has failed both to carry his burden to establish this court’s jurisdiction or comply with the court’s Order. In any event, liberally construing Plaintiff’s Complaint, the court finds that it does not have federal question or diversity jurisdiction. The court thus recommends that Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed.

Federal Question

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was injured “on the job” and that he was “never given workman[‘]s comp[ensation].” (Dkt. #3 at p. 4). While Plaintiff does not cite a specific statute, his claims appear to arise under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act (“TWCA”). TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 401–450. Because the TWCA is a statute of the State of Texas, Plaintiff’s claims do not arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Cevallos v. Silva, 541 F. App’x 390, 393 (5th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain any other allegations that purportedly give rise to a federal question (Dkt. #3). Accordingly, the court does not have federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Diversity Jurisdiction

Because federal question jurisdiction is not present, Plaintiff must rely on diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction exists “where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000” and “ ‘complete diversity’ ” exists; diversity does not exist “if one of the plaintiffs shares the same citizenship as any one of the defendants.” Corfield v. Dallas Glen Hills LP, 355 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged the citizenship of either Party. See Smith v. Toyota Motor Corp., 978 F.3d 280, 282 (5th Cir. 2020) (“The party asserting diversity jurisdiction must distinctly and affirmatively allege the citizenship of the parties.”) (citation omitted; cleaned up). In any event, a review of the Parties’ addresses indicates that the Parties are not diverse: Plaintiffis currently incarcerated in Henderson, Texas, and brings claims against an entity purportedly located in Paris, Texas (Dkt. #3 at pp. 1, 6). Accordingly, based on the information available, the Parties are not diverse. See Carter v. Travelers Indem., No. 3:17-cv-1816-N-BN, 2017 WL 4174814, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2017) (stating that “[d]iversity jurisdiction exists where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the parties are completely diverse[ ]”).

*3 Even if the Parties were diverse, Plaintiff has not established that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Federal courts have found that when a plaintiff fails to allege an amount in controversy over $75,000, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in diversity. Fritze v. AmerCareRoyal LLC, 5:23-CV-01368-FB-RBF, 2024 WL 4799339, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct 28, 2024). Here, Plaintiff does not plead any specific amount in controversy (Dkt. #3). Instead, Plaintiff alleges that he sustained injuries and underwent a “corrective” surgery (Dkt. #3 at p. 4). As such, Plaintiff has not met his burden to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Because neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction are present, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. As such, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).

Dismissal for Want of Prosecution

Plaintiff’s case should likewise be dismissed for want of prosecution. On April 21, 2025, the court ordered Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint by May 16, 2025 (Dkt. #10). To date, Plaintiff has not filed an Amended Complaint and has thus failed to comply with the court’s Order. Additionally, Plaintiff failed to pay his initial partial filing fee as ordered (Dkt. #11). Accordingly, this case should be dismissed without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute and comply with court orders. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); see Isom v. Indio Mgmt. at the Everly, No.4:20-CV-947-SDJ-CAN, 2021 WL 5501786, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2021) (“The court recommends the instant suit be dismissed under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with court Orders and to diligently prosecute.”), report and recommendation adopted, No.4:20-CV-947-SDJ, 2021 WL 5493377 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2021); Shuemake v. Botie Hillhouse, No. 6:18CV349, 2021 WL 3044433, at *1 (E.D. Tex. July 2, 2021) (explaining that plaintiff’s “failure to submit an updated mailing address evinces his failure to prosecute his own case”), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Ernest Bob Shuemake v. Botie Hillhouse, No. 6:18CV349, 2021 WL 3032725 (E.D. Tex. July 19, 2021); Bennett v. Smith Cnty. Jail, No. 6:21CV010, 2021 WL 930282, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2021) (“Plaintiff’s failure to submit an updated mailing address evinces his failure to prosecute his own case.”), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Bennett v. Smith, No. 6:21-CV-00010, 2021 WL 926207 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2021).

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends that this case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) and 41(b).

Within fourteen (14) days after service of the magistrate judge’s report, any party must serve and file specific written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific.

Failure to file specific, written objections will bar the party from appealing the unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen days). Shuemake v. Hillhouse, No. 6:18CV349, 2021 WL 3044433, at *1 (E.D. Tex. July 2, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:18CV349, 2021 WL 3032725 (E.D. Tex. July 19, 2021).

*4 SIGNED this 22nd day of August, 2025.