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This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on July 17, 2023, in (city), Texas, with (administrative law judge) presiding as the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ resolved the disputed issues by deciding that: (1) the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease with a date of injury (DOI) of (date of injury); (2) the respondent (carrier) is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001; and (3) the carrier is relieved of liability under Section 409.004 because of the claimant’s failure to timely file a claim for compensation with the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation (Division) within one year of the injury as required by Section 409.003. The claimant appealed, disputing the ALJ’s determinations. The carrier responded, urging affirmance of the ALJ’s determinations.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
The claimant contended he contracted coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) while working for the employer. The claimant testified he first experienced symptoms on April 10, 2021, while mowing grass at his house. The claimant initially thought he hurt his back while mowing, but his symptoms, which included pain in his back and chest as well as dizzy spells, progressed so he went to the hospital and was diagnosed with COVID-19. The claimant testified he believed he caught COVID-19 at work, and that seven to nine other employees were also diagnosed with COVID-19 at that time.
The ALJ is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). As an appellate reviewing tribunal, the Appeals Panel will not disturb challenged factual findings of an ALJ absent legal error, unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease with a DOI of (date of injury), is based upon the ALJ’s findings that the claimant’s employment did not place him at greater risk of developing COVID-19 than employment generally, and that his injurious condition did not arise as a result of his employment. These findings are supported by sufficient evidence. Therefore, we affirm the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease with a DOI of (date of injury).
The ALJ’s determination that the carrier is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001 is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
Section 409.003 requires, in pertinent part, an employee or a person acting on the employee’s behalf to file a claim for compensation with the Division for an occupational disease not later than one year after the date the employee knew or should have known that the disease was related to the employee’s employment. Section 409.004 provides, in part, that an employee’s failure to file a claim for compensation as required under Section 409.003 relieves the carrier of liability unless good cause exists for failure to file a claim in a timely manner.
The ALJ found in Finding of Fact No. 7 that the claimant did not file a claim for compensation with the Division within one year of the injury as required by Section 409.003. The Appeals Panel has required an ALJ to take official notice of essential Division forms where timely filing requirements are an issue. See Appeals Panel Decision (APD) 030295, decided March 27, 2003. To determine whether the claimant filed a claim for compensation within one year of (date of injury), the DOI in this case, it is essential to know the date on which the claimant filed a claim with the Division. There is nothing in evidence that establishes when, or even if, the claimant filed a claim with the Division. Accordingly, we reverse the ALJ’s determination that the carrier is relieved of liability under Section 409.004 because of the claimant’s failure to timely file a claim for compensation with the Division within one year of the injury as required by Section 409.003. We remand this case for the ALJ to take official notice of whether the claimant filed a claim for compensation with the Division, and if so, the date the claimant filed his claim.
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease with a DOI of (date of injury).
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that the carrier is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001.
We reverse the ALJ’s determination that the carrier is relieved of liability under Section 409.004 because of the claimant’s failure to timely file a claim for compensation with the Division within one year of the injury as required by Section 409.003, and we remand this case for further action consistent with this decision.
On remand, the ALJ is to take official notice of whether the claimant filed a claim for compensation with the Division, and if so, the date the claimant filed his claim, and allow the parties an opportunity to review and respond. The ALJ is to make findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decision on whether the carrier is relieved of liability under Section 409.004 because of the claimant’s failure to timely file a claim for compensation with the Division within one year of the injury as required by Section 409.003.
Pending resolution of the remand, a final decision has not been made in this case. However, since reversal and remand necessitate the issuance of a new decision and order by the ALJ, a party who wishes to appeal from such new decision must file a request for review not later than 15 days after the date on which such new decision is received from the Division, pursuant to Section 410.202 which was amended June 17, 2001, to exclude Saturdays and Sundays and holidays listed in Section 662.003 of the Texas Government Code in the computation of the 15-day appeal and response periods. See APD 060721, decided June 12, 2006.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is SERVICE LLOYDS INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
J. KELLY GRAY
6907 NORTH CAPITAL OF TEXAS HIGHWAY
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78731-1755.
Carisa Space-Beam
Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Cristina Beceiro
Appeals Judge
Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge
This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on April 4, 2023, in (city), Texas, with (administrative law judge) presiding as the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ resolved the disputed issues by deciding that: (1) the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury on (date of injury); (2) the injury sustained on (date of injury), did not arise out of voluntary participation in an off-duty athletic activity not constituting part of the claimant’s work-related duties; (3) the appellant (self-insured) is not relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because the claimant timely notified his employer pursuant to Section 409.001; and (4) the self-insured did specifically contest compensability on the issue of liability pursuant to Section 409.022 and 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 124.2(f) (Rule 124.2(f)). The self-insured appealed, disputing the ALJ’s determinations regarding compensability, timely notice to the employer, and voluntary participation in an off-duty athletic activity. The claimant responded, urging affirmance of the appealed determinations.
The ALJ’s determination that the self-insured did specifically contest compensability on the issue of liability pursuant to Section 409.022 and Rule 124.2(f) was not appealed and has become final pursuant to Section 410.169.
Affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part.
The claimant, a sheriff’s deputy assigned to the self-insured’s detention bureau, was injured on (date of injury), while participating in an off-duty agility test in order to be eligible for transfer or promotion to different positions within the department. While running with a 200-pound dummy, the claimant felt his left knee pop in and out. He was later diagnosed with a ruptured patellar tendon.
The ALJ is the sole judge of the weight and credibility to the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). As an appellate reviewing tribunal, the Appeals Panel will not disturb challenged factual findings of an ALJ absent legal error, unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The ALJ’s determination that the self-insured is not relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because the claimant timely notified his employer pursuant to Section 409.001 is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
Section 401.011(12) defines course and scope of employment as:
[A]n activity of any kind or character that has to do with and originates in the work, business, trade, or profession of the employer and that is performed by an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer. The term includes an activity conducted on the premises of the employer or at other locations.
Section 406.032(1)(D) states that an insurance carrier is not liable for compensation if the injury arose out of voluntary participation in an off-duty recreational, social, or athletic activity that did not constitute part of the employee’s work-related duties, unless the activity is a reasonable expectancy of or is expressly or impliedly required by the employment.
The claimant in this case elected to participate in a physical agility test on (date of injury), in order to be eligible for a transfer or promotion to a different job position with the employer. The ALJ noted in his decision that the employer advertised the opportunity through the email system to all employees as well as posting it on a bulletin board. The evidence reflects that participation in the agility test was not mandatory for the claimant’s job as a sheriff’s deputy but for consideration for transfer or promotion to another position.
Appeals Panel Decision (APD) 140388, decided April 25, 2014, is a similar case in which a detention service officer (DSO) participated in a mandatory pre-physical readiness assessment in order to apply for a deputy position. In that case, the Appeals Panel, citing APD 961159, decided July 29, 1996, reversed the determination of the ALJ that the claimant sustained a compensable injury and stated that the claimant was not directed to take the test but voluntarily underwent the physical readiness assessment, just as any other candidate did, and not as part of her employment as a DSO.
Likewise in the current case, the claimant was not directed by the employer to take the physical agility test but elected to do so in order to be eligible for transfer or promotion to a different job position and not as part of his employment duties as a sheriff’s deputy. Accordingly, we reverse the ALJ’s determination that the injury sustained on (date of injury), did not arise out of voluntary participation in an off-duty athletic activity not constituting part of the claimant’s work-related duties, and render a new decision that the injury sustained on (date of injury), did arise out of voluntary participation in an off-duty athletic activity not constituting part of the claimant’s work-related duties.
As we have rendered a new decision that the claimant’s injury arose out of an off-duty athletic activity not constituting part of the claimant’s work-related duties, we also reverse the ALJ’s determination that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on (date of injury), and we render a new decision that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury).
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that the self-insured is not relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because the claimant timely notified his employer pursuant to Section 409.001.
We reverse the ALJ’s determination that the injury sustained on (date of injury), did not arise out of voluntary participation in an off-duty athletic activity not constituting part of the claimant’s work-related duties, and render a new decision that the injury sustained on (date of injury), did arise out of voluntary participation in an off-duty athletic activity not constituting part of the claimant’s work-related duties.
We reverse the ALJ’s determination that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on (date of injury), and we render a new decision that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury).
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
(NAME)
(ADDRESS)
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).
Cristina Beceiro
Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Carisa Space-Beam
Appeals Judge
Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge
This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on March 22, 2023, with the record closing on April 6, 2023, in (city), Texas, with (administrative law judge) presiding as the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ resolved the disputed issues in Docket No. (number) by deciding that: (1) the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury on July 1, 2021; and (2) respondent 2 (carrier 2) is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001. The claimant appealed, disputing the ALJ’s determinations. The claimant points out on appeal that the ALJ’s decision lists no findings of fact regarding the appealed issues. Carrier 2 responded, urging affirmance of the ALJ’s determinations.
The ALJ resolved the disputed issue in Docket No. (number) by deciding that the compensable injury of May 15, 2001, does not extend to a triangular fibrocartilage complex tear of the left wrist. Neither the claimant nor respondent 1 (carrier 1) appealed the ALJ’s decision in Docket No. (number); accordingly, the ALJ’s determination in that docket number has become final pursuant to Section 410.169.
Reversed and remanded.
The claimant contends he sustained a compensable repetitive trauma injury with a date of injury of July 1, 2021, by injuring his left wrist while stripping nuts and bolts from several cars per day using various power tools. The claimant testified he stripped approximately ten to fifteen cars a day, and that most of the bolts were corroded and required extra work to remove them.
Section 410.168 provides that an ALJ’s decision contains findings of fact and conclusions of law, a determination of whether benefits are due, and an award of benefits due. 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 142.16 (Rule 142.16) provides that an ALJ’s decision shall be in writing and include findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a determination of whether benefits are due, and if so, an award of benefits due.
The ALJ states in Conclusion of Law No. 3 that the claimant did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury on July 1, 2021. The ALJ states in Conclusion of Law No. 4 that carrier 2 is relieved of liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001. Although the ALJ made a conclusion of law, decision, and discussed the compensability and timely notice to the employer issues in his discussion of the evidence, the ALJ failed to make a finding of fact on either of these two issues. Because the ALJ’s decision contains no findings of fact regarding these two issues, which were properly before him to resolve, it does not comply with Section 410.168 and Rule 142.16. We therefore reverse the ALJ’s determinations that the claimant did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury on July 1, 2021, and that carrier 2 is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001 as being incomplete, and we remand these issues to the ALJ for further action consistent with this decision. See Appeals Panel Decision (APD) 132339, decided December 12, 2013; APD 180839, decided, June 4, 2018; and APD 211064, decided September 1, 2021.
We reverse the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury on July 1, 2021, as being incomplete, and we remand the issue whether the claimant sustained a compensable repetitive trauma injury with a date of injury of July 1, 2021, to the ALJ for further action consistent with this decision.
We reverse the ALJ’s determination that carrier 2 is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001 as being incomplete, and we remand the issue of timely notice to the employer to the ALJ for further action consistent with this decision.
On remand the ALJ is to make findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decision regarding whether the claimant sustained a compensable repetitive trauma injury with a date of injury of July 1, 2021, and whether carrier 2 is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001.
Pending resolution of the remand, a final decision has not been made in this case. However, since reversal and remand necessitate the issuance of a new decision and order by the ALJ, a party who wishes to appeal from such new decision must file a request for review not later than 15 days after the date on which such new decision is received from the Division, pursuant to Section 410.202 which was amended June 17, 2001, to exclude Saturdays and Sundays and holidays listed in Section 662.003 of the Texas Government Code in the computation of the 15-day appeal and response periods. See APD 060721, decided June 12, 2006.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is SENTRY CASUALTY COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
1999 BRYAN STREET SUITE 900
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201-3136.
Carisa Space-Beam
Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Cristina Beceiro
Appeals Judge
Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge
This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on April 6, 2023, in (city), Texas, with (administrative law judge) presiding as the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ resolved the disputed issues by deciding that: (1) the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury); (2) the respondent (carrier) is not relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of a failure by the claimant to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001; and (3) because the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, he did not have disability beginning August 26, 2022, and continuing through January 25, 2023. The claimant appealed, disputing the ALJ’s compensability and disability determinations. The carrier responded, urging affirmance of the appealed determinations.
The ALJ’s determination that the carrier is not relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of a failure by the claimant to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001 was not appealed and has become final pursuant to Section 410.169.
Affirmed in part and reversed by striking in part.
The claimant, a truck driver, claimed that he was injured on (date of injury), while driving. He testified that he was gripping the steering wheel with both hands on that date when he felt clicking and popping in his left thumb.
The ALJ is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). As an appellate reviewing tribunal, the Appeals Panel will not disturb challenged factual findings of an ALJ absent legal error, unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury), is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
In evidence is a Benefit Review Conference (BRC) Report dated February 7, 2023. The BRC report states that the third disputed issue is: Did the claimant have disability resulting from the claimed injury? At the CCH on April 6, 2023, the parties agreed to amend the disability issue to read: Did the claimant have disability resulting from the claimed injury from August 26, 2022, through January 22, 2023? However, the ALJ then made a finding of fact, conclusion of law, and a decision that the claimant did not have disability from August 26, 2022, through January 25, 2023.
The ALJ’s disability determination exceeded the scope of the disability issue before him to decide. Accordingly, we strike that portion of the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not have disability from January 23, 2023, through January 25, 2023. That portion of the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not have disability from August 26, 2022, through January 22, 2023, is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury).
We affirm that part of the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not have disability from August 26, 2022, through January 22, 2023.
We strike that portion of the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not have disability from January 23, 2023, through January 25, 2023, as exceeding the scope of the disability issue before the ALJ.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is GREAT WEST CASUALTY COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
MICHAEL METZGER
624 SIX FLAGS DRIVE, SUITE 240
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011.
Cristina Beceiro
Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Carisa Space-Beam
Appeals Judge
Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge
This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on February 23, 2023, in (city), Texas, with (administrative law judge) presiding as the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ resolved the disputed issues by deciding that: (1) the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury on (date of injury); (2) the appellant (carrier) is not relieved of liability under Section 409.002 because the claimant timely notified the employer of his injury pursuant to Section 409.001; (3) the carrier waived the right to contest compensability of the claimed injury by not timely contesting the injury in accordance with Section 409.021; and (4) the claimant had disability from September 1, 2022, through January 9, 2023, resulting from the compensable injury. The carrier appealed, disputing the ALJ’s determinations. The appeal file does not contain a response from the claimant to the carrier’s appeal.
Affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part.
The claimant, a material handler for the employer, asserted he was injured on (date of injury), while working on a stacking station. The claimant was removing bags of insulation from a conveyor belt and then stacking the bags onto a pallet. The claimant testified that he was going three times his normal speed and was not watching his movements, and felt a sharp pain in his lower back when he put a bag on the pallet.
The ALJ is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). As an appellate reviewing tribunal, the Appeals Panel will not disturb challenged factual findings of an ALJ absent legal error, unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The carrier contends that the ALJ abused his discretion in failing to rule on its motion to add the issue of the date of injury in this case, as well as not consolidating another claim with the case on appeal. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the Appeals Panel looks to see whether the ALJ acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1986). Under the circumstances of this case, we do not find the ALJ’s actions an abuse of discretion.
The ALJ’s determination that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on (date of injury), is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
The ALJ’s determination that the carrier is not relieved of liability under Section 409.002 because the claimant timely notified the employer of his injury pursuant to Section 409.001 is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
The ALJ’s determination that the claimant had disability from September 1, 2022, through January 9, 2023, is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
Section 409.021(a) provides in part that not later than the 15th day after the date on which an insurance carrier receives written notice of an injury, the insurance carrier shall: (1) begin the payment of benefits as required by the 1989 Act; or (2) notify the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation (Division) and the employee in writing of its refusal to pay. Section 409.021(c) provides in part that if an insurance carrier does not contest the compensability of an injury on or before the 60th day after the date on which the insurance carrier is notified of the injury, the insurance carrier waives its right to contest compensability. 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 124.2(d) (Rule 124.2(d)) provides that a carrier shall notify the Division and the claimant of a denial of a claim based on non-compensability or lack of coverage in accordance with this section and as otherwise provided by this title. Rule 124.2(i) provides in part that notification to the claimant requires the carrier to use plain language notices in the form and manner prescribed by the Division, and that the notice shall provide a full and complete statement describing the carrier’s action and rationale. The statement must contain sufficient claim-specific substantive information to enable the claimant to understand the carrier’s position or action taken on the claim.
In evidence is a written statement from the claimant dated September 6, 2022, in which he alleged a work-related injury that occurred on (additional date). The claimant testified at the CCH that the injury actually occurred on (date of injury), and that his written statement contained a typographical error regarding the date of injury. The claimant further testified that no injury occurred on (additional date). However, based on the claimant’s written statement the employer provided an Employer’s First Report of Injury or Illness (DWC-1) dated September 26, 2022, to the carrier specifying (additional date), as the date of injury.
The evidence reflects the carrier received first written notice of an injury on September 26, 2022, for a (additional date), date of injury, and that the carrier filed a Notice of Denial of Compensability/Liability and Refusal to Pay Benefits (PLN-1) dated October 14, 2022, which was within the 60 days the carrier had to contest compensability, that was sent to both the Division and the claimant. The PLN-1 references the date of injury as (additional date), and identifies the injury as a strain to the upper and lower back areas. The body of the PLN-1 states the following:
[w]e denied your claim because: [the] [c]arrier disputes that you sustained a compensable injury in the course and scope of your employment on [(additional date),] for the reasons that follow. You did not report a work injury to your supervisor within [30] days as required by [Section 409.001], thereby relieving the [c]arrier of liability under [Section 409.002]. When you informed your employer of an injury, you initially did not specify that it was related to your work. Rather, you indicated that you did not know where it happened. To date, you have not provided any medical records that establish a work injury occurred on or around [(additional date),] and have been unable to specify how the alleged injury occurred. You also indicated that you felt discomfort from a work activity on [(additional date)], but pain and discomfort are not injuries. Moreover, you have asserted that a chiropractic manipulation after that date made your back worse, suggesting this as the possible true source of any injury you may now have. You have not provided said chiropractic records, and the first medical treatment in [the] [c]arrier’s possession was not obtained until [September 6, 2022], more than two months following the date of claimed injury. [The] [c]arrier reserves the right to amend or supplant this notice as its investigation continues.
Also in evidence is a notice of injury dated October 4, 2022, from the Division to the carrier, indicating the Division received notice of an injury to the claimant with a date of injury of (date of injury).
On December 21, 2022, the carrier filed another PLN-1, which was outside 60 days of receiving the first written notice of the claim sent by the Division on October 4, 2022. This PLN-1 identifies the claimant’s date of injury as (date of injury), and the injury as a strain to the lower back area. The PLN-1 does not contain a claim number, but does identify the claimant, the employer, and the employer’s address. The body of the PLN-1 is virtually identical to that found in the October 14, 2022, PLN-1, with minor exceptions, including identifying the date of injury as (date of injury), and that the claimant had originally claimed an injury dated (additional date).
In the discussion portion of the decision the ALJ noted the Division’s October 4, 2022, notice of injury for the (date of injury), date of injury, and that the carrier filed a PLN-1 regarding that notice on December 21, 2022. The ALJ also discussed the carrier’s PLN-1 filed on October 14, 2022, disputing the (additional date), date of injury. The ALJ stated the following:
The insurance carrier argued that there was no (additional date), injury, therefore, the October 14, 2022, notice of denial should apply to this claim. This argument was unpersuasive. The insurance carrier did not timely dispute compensability, and did waive the right to dispute compensability of this claim.
In Appeals Panel Decision (APD) 011090 and APD 011091, both decided July 2, 2001, there was a reported injury involving multiple upper extremities/hands/wrists/arms with a July date of injury. The carrier timely disputed this injury. Subsequently, the claims involving the left and right upper extremities were divided into two separate claims and the claimant alleged an injury/occupational disease, affecting only the left hand and wrist, with a May date of injury. The carrier filed no additional dispute in response to this later date of injury. The Appeals Panel reversed the ALJ’s determination that the carrier waived the right to contest compensability of the May left upper extremity injury and held that the dispute filed by the carrier was intended to serve as a contest of the compensability of the claimed bilateral upper extremities injuries, which included a contest of compensability of the left upper extremity injury. The Appeals Panel stated that to require the carrier to dispute an injury, which it had previously disputed, simply because the initial claim had been divided into two claims and the claimant alleged a different date of injury for one of the claimed injuries, would represent an elevation of form over substance. See also APD 080678, decided June 25, 2008.
In the case on appeal, the typographical error contained in the claimant’s written statement reflecting a date of injury of (additional date), rather than (date of injury), resulted in an incorrect date of injury on the carrier’s first written notice of the claimant’s injury. The carrier’s PLN-1 dated October 14, 2022, contained sufficient claim-specific information, including a full and complete statement of the grounds for contesting compensability, to inform the claimant of the carrier’s denial of his injury. Under these facts, to require the carrier in this case to again dispute the injury it had previously disputed simply because the claimant alleged a different date of injury due to a typographical error would represent an elevation of form over substance. Therefore, we reverse the ALJ’s determination that the carrier waived the right to contest compensability of the claimed injury by not timely contesting the injury in accordance with Section 409.021, and we render a new decision that the carrier did not waive the right to contest compensability of the claimed injury because the carrier timely contested the injury in accordance with Section 409.021.
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on (date of injury).
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that the carrier is not relieved of liability under Section 409.002 because the claimant timely notified the employer of his injury pursuant to Section 409.001.
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that the claimant had disability from September 1, 2022, through January 9, 2023, resulting from the compensable injury.
We reverse the ALJ’s determination that the carrier waived the right to contest compensability of the claimed injury by not timely contesting the injury in accordance with Section 409.021, and we render a new decision that the carrier did not waive the right to contest compensability of the claimed injury because the carrier timely contested the injury in accordance with Section 409.021.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is ACCIDENT FUND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
1999 BRYAN STREET, SUITE 900
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Carisa Space-Beam
Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Cristina Beceiro
Appeals Judge
Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge
This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on December 29, 2022, in (city), Texas, with (administrative law judge) presiding as the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ resolved the disputed issues by deciding that: (1) the date of injury is (date of injury); (2) the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury on (date of injury); (3) the respondent (self-insured) is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because the claimant did not timely notify her employer pursuant to Section 409.001; (4) the self-insured is relieved from liability under Section 409.004 because of the claimant’s failure to timely file a claim for compensation with the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation (Division) within one year of the injury as required by Section 409.003; and (5) because the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury), the claimant did not have disability resulting from the claimed injury. The claimant appealed, disputing the ALJ’s determinations regarding compensability, timely reporting, timely filing, and disability. The self-insured responded, urging affirmance of the appealed determinations.
The ALJ’s determination that the date of injury is (date of injury), was not appealed and has become final pursuant to Section 410.169.
Affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part.
The parties stipulated, in part, that the date of injury is (date of injury). The claimant testified that she was injured while working as a Life Skills Aide due to the repetitious actions of lifting, clothing, and feeding disabled children who weighed between 80 and 100 pounds.
The ALJ is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). As an appellate reviewing tribunal, the Appeals Panel will not disturb challenged factual findings of an ALJ absent legal error, unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury on (date of injury), is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
The ALJ’s determination that the self-insured is relieved from liability under Section 409.004 because of the claimant’s failure to timely file a claim for compensation with the Division within one year of the injury as required by Section 409.003 is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
The ALJ’s determination that because the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury), the claimant did not have disability resulting from the claimed injury is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
The parties stipulated that the date of injury in this case is (date of injury). Additionally, the ALJ found that on January 4, 2021, the claimant reported the claimed injury to the employer. This finding is supported by sufficient evidence.
Section 409.001(a)(2) provides that, if the injury is an occupational disease, an employee or a person acting on the employee’s behalf shall notify the employer of the employee of an injury not later than the 30th day after the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury may be related to the employment.
The ALJ determined that the claimant did not timely report her work injury to the employer because January 4, 2021, is more than 30 days from the claimed injury and that because the claimant did not timely report her injury, the self-insured is relieved of liability under Section 409.002. We conclude that the ALJ erred in determining that the claimant did not timely report her injury because the 30th day after (date of injury), was Saturday, January 2, 2021, and the claimant gave notice on the next working day, Monday, January 4, 2021. During the time period under consideration, 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 102.3(a)(3) (Rule 102.3(a)(3)) provided that, if the last day of any period is not a working day, the period is extended to include the next day that is a working day. A working day is defined in Rule 102.3(b). In Appeals Panel Decision (APD) 950658, decided June 12, 1995, the Appeals Panel, citing Sections 311.014(a) and (b) of the Code Construction Act and Rule 102.3(a), held that where the 30th day after the date of injury was a Sunday, notice of injury was timely when given on the next working day, a Monday. See also APD 002549, decided December 11, 2000; and APD 160634, decided May 24, 2016. Accordingly, we reverse the ALJ’s determination that the self-insured is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because the claimant failed to timely notify her employer pursuant to Section 409.001 and render a new decision that the self-insured is not relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because the claimant timely notified her employer pursuant to Section 409.001.
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury on (date of injury).
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that the self-insured is relieved from liability under Section 409.004 because of the claimant’s failure to timely file a claim for compensation with the Division within one year of the injury as required by Section 409.003.
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that because the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury), the claimant did not have disability resulting from the claimed injury.
We reverse the ALJ’s determination that the self-insured is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because the claimant failed to timely notify her employer pursuant to Section 409.001 and render a new decision that the self-insured is not relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because the claimant timely notified her employer pursuant to Section 409.001.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
(NAME)
(ADDRESS)
(CITY), (STATE) (ZIP CODE).
Cristina Beceiro
Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Carisa Space-Beam
Appeals Judge
Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge
This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on July 6, 2021, in (city), Texas, with (administrative law judge) presiding as the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ resolved the disputed issues, pursuant to an agreement reached by the parties, by determining that: (1) the appellant (claimant) sustained a compensable injury on (date of injury); (2) the respondent (carrier) is not relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because the claimant timely notified his employer pursuant to Section 409.001; (3) the claimant had disability from September 16, 2020, through November 19, 2020, resulting from the (date of injury), compensable injury, but the claimant did not have disability from November 20, 2020, through the date of the CCH resulting from the (date of injury), compensable injury.
The claimant appealed that portion of the ALJ’s disability determination that he did not have disability from November 20, 2020, through the date of the CCH resulting from the (date of injury), compensable injury, contending the parties did not make an agreement concerning that period of disability. The appeal file does not contain a response from the carrier to the claimant’s appeal. The ALJ’s determinations that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on (date of injury); the carrier is not relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because the claimant timely notified his employer pursuant to Section 409.001; and the claimant had disability from September 16, 2020, through November 19, 2020, resulting from the (date of injury), compensable injury were not appealed and have become final pursuant to Section 410.169.
Affirmed as reformed.
Section 410.166 and 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 147.4(c) (Rule 147.4(c)) provide, in part, that an oral agreement of the parties that is preserved in the record is final and binding on the date made. As noted by the ALJ in her decision, Issue Number 3 was revised upon the agreement of the parties to determine whether the claimant had disability resulting from the (date of injury), compensable injury from September 16, 2020, through November 19, 2020. The record reflects that the parties agreed orally at the CCH that “the claimant did have disability resulting from the claimed injury from September 16, 2020, through November 19, 2020.” Although the decision and order correctly states that the claimant had disability from September 16, 2020, through November 19, 2020, the decision and order also states that the claimant did not have disability from November 20, 2020, through the date of the CCH. The record reflects there is no agreement by the parties regarding a disability period of November 20, 2020, through the date of the CCH. Therefore, we reform the ALJ’s decision by striking all references to a disability period of November 20, 2020, through the date of the CCH.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is TEXAS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
MR. RICHARD GERGASKO, PRESIDENT
2200 ALDRICH STREET
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78723.
Carisa Space-Beam
Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Cristina Beceiro
Appeals Judge
Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge
This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on November 2, 2020, and May 17, 2021, with the record closing on June 8, 2021, in (city), Texas, with (administrative law judge) presiding as the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ resolved the disputed issues by deciding that: (1) the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury; (2) the date of injury is (date of injury); (3) respondent 1 (carrier 1) and respondent 2 (carrier 2) are relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001; (4) carrier 1 and carrier 2 are relieved from liability because of the claimant’s failure to timely file a claim for compensation with the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation (Division) within one year of the injury as required by Section 409.003; and (5) because the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, the claimant did not have disability as a result of the claimed injury from March 9, 2020, to the date of the CCH. The claimant appealed, disputing the ALJ’s determinations of compensability, date of injury, timely notice to employer, timely filing of a claim, and disability. Both carrier 1 and carrier 2 responded, urging affirmance of the disputed determinations.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
The claimant testified that he injured his left arm because of repetitive activities performed in the course and scope of his employment.
The ALJ is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). As an appellate reviewing tribunal, the Appeals Panel will not disturb challenged factual findings of an ALJ absent legal error, unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The ALJ’s determination that the date of injury is (date of injury), pursuant to Section 408.007 is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed. This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar, et al. v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
The ALJ’s determination that because the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, the claimant did not have disability resulting from the claimed injury from March 9, 2020, to the date of the CCH is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
The ALJ’s determination that carrier 1 and carrier 2 are relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001 is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
Section 410.168 provides that an ALJ’s decision contain findings of fact and conclusions of law, a determination of whether benefits are due, and an award of benefits due. 28 Tex. Admin. Code §142.16 (Rule 142.16) provides that an ALJ’s decision shall be in writing and include findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a determination of whether benefits are due, and if so, an award of benefits due.
The ALJ states in Conclusion of Law No. 6, the summary paragraph on page one, and Decision section on pages 9 and 10 that carrier 1 and carrier 2 are relieved from liability because of the claimant’s failure to timely file a claim for compensation with the Division within one year of the injury as required by Section 409.003. Although the ALJ made a conclusion of law, decision, and discussed the timely filing of a claim in his discussion of the evidence, the ALJ failed to make a finding of fact whether the claimant timely filed a claim for compensation with the Division. Because the ALJ’s decision contains no findings of fact regarding the timely filing issue, which was an issue properly before the ALJ to resolve, it does not comply with Section 410.168 and Rule 142.16. We therefore reverse the ALJ’s determination that carrier 1 and carrier 2 are relieved from liability because of the claimant’s failure to timely file a claim for compensation with the Division within one year of the injury as required by Section 409.003 as being incomplete, and we remand the issue of timely filing of a claim for compensation. See Appeals Panel Decision (APD) 132339, decided December 12, 2013, and APD 180839, decided, June 4, 2018.
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that the date of injury is (date of injury), pursuant to Section 408.007.
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury.
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that because the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, the claimant did not have disability resulting from the claimed injury from March 9, 2020, to the date of the CCH.
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that carrier 1 and carrier 2 are relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001.
We reverse the ALJ’s determination that carrier 1 and carrier 2 are relieved from liability because of the claimant’s failure to timely file a claim for compensation with the Division within one year of the injury as required by Section 409.003 as being incomplete, and we remand the issue of timely filing of a claim for compensation to the ALJ for further action consistent with this decision.
On remand the ALJ is to make a finding of fact, conclusion of law, and a decision regarding whether carrier 1 and carrier 2 are relieved form liability because of the claimant’s failure to timely file a claim for compensation with the Division within one year of the injury as required by Section 409.003.
Pending resolution of the remand, a final decision has not been made in this case. However, since reversal and remand necessitate the issuance of a new decision and order by the ALJ, a party who wishes to appeal from such new decision must file a request for review not later than 15 days after the date on which such new decision is received from the Division, pursuant to Section 410.202 which was amended June 17, 2001, to exclude Saturdays and Sundays and holidays listed in Section 662.003 of the Texas Government Code in the computation of the 15-day appeal and response periods. See APD 060721, decided June 12, 2006.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier 1 is ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
1999 BRYAN STREET, SUITE 900
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier 2 is ELECTRIC INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
C T CORPORATION SYSTEM
1999 BRYAN STREET SUITE 900
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201-3136.
Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Cristina Beceiro
Appeals Judge
Carisa Space-Beam
Appeals Judge
This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on March 4, 2021, in (city), Texas, with (administrative law judge) presiding as the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ resolved the disputed issues by deciding that: (1) the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury); and (2) the respondent (self-insured) is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify her employer pursuant to Section 409.001.
The claimant appealed the ALJ’s compensability and timely notice determinations. The self-insured responded, urging affirmance of the appealed determinations.
Reversed and remanded.
This case is remanded for the purpose of compliance with House Bill (H.B.) 2600 of the 77th Texas Legislature, Regular Session (R.S.) amending Section 410.164, effective June 17, 2001. Section 410.164 was amended by the addition of subsection (c), which provides as follows:
(c) At each [CCH], as applicable, the insurance carrier shall file with the [ALJ] and shall deliver to the claimant a single document stating the true corporate name of the insurance carrier and the name and address of the insurance carrier's registered agent for service of process. The document is part of the record of the [CCH].1
In this case, the address provided on the carrier’s information form for the person identified as the registered agent was a post office box, where service of process cannot be effectuated. Therefore, we remand so that a street address may be provided by the self-insured for its registered agent, in order to carry out the purpose of the legislation. See Appeals Panel Decision (APD) 210080, decided March 12, 2021.
Pending resolution of the remand, a final decision has not been made in this case. However, since reversal and remand necessitate the issuance of a new decision and order by the ALJ, a party who wishes to appeal from such new decision must file a request for review not later than 15 days after the date on which such new decision is received from the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation, pursuant to Section 410.202 which was amended June 17, 2001, to exclude Saturdays and Sundays and holidays listed in Section 662.003 of the Texas Government Code in the computation of the 15-day appeal and response periods. See APD 060721, decided June 12, 2006.
Cristina Beceiro
Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Carisa Space-Beam
Appeals Judge
Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge
1 Section 410.164 was amended effective September 1, 2017, to change “hearing officer” to “administrative law judge.” Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 839 (H.B. 2111), Sec. 8, eff. September 1, 2017.
This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 28, 2020, and January 11, 2021, in (city), Texas, with (administrative law judge) presiding as the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ resolved the disputed issues by deciding that: (1) the appellant (claimant), for workers’ compensation purposes, was not an employee of (employer), at the time of the claimed injury on (date of injury); (2) the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury); (3) the respondent (carrier) is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001; and (4) because the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, the claimant did not have disability from June 30, 2018, through September 1, 2018. The claimant appealed the ALJ’s determinations. The carrier responded, urging affirmance of the ALJ’s determinations.
Affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part.
The claimant testified that on (date of injury), he was injured when he was rear-ended while driving his taxi. The ALJ is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). As an appellate reviewing tribunal, the Appeals Panel will not disturb challenged factual findings of an ALJ absent legal error, unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The ALJ’s determination that the claimant, for workers’ compensation purposes, was not an employee of (employer), at the time of the claimed injury on (date of injury), is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
The ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury), is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
The ALJ’s determination that because the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, the claimant did not have disability from June 30, 2018, through September 1, 2018, is supported by sufficient evidence and is affirmed.
The ALJ noted in her discussion that the claimant credibly testified he notified his dispatcher on the date of injury and that his dispatcher provided transportation for him from the hospital. The ALJ further noted that if the claim was found to be compensable, the carrier is not relieved of liability since the claimant contacted his employer, or someone in a supervisory position with the employer, within 30 days of the date of injury. The ALJ found in Finding of Fact No. 8 that the claimant notified the employer, or an employee holding a supervisory or management position, of the (date of injury), injury within 30 days of the date of injury. The ALJ also found in Finding of Fact No. 9 that because there is no compensable injury, the issue as to the timely reporting of an injury to the claimed employer is moot. However, Conclusion of Law No. 5, the Decision, and the Decision and Order paragraph on the first page of the decision all state that the carrier is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001. The ALJ made inconsistent and conflicting findings of fact and determinations regarding the issue of timely notice to the employer. Usually, a case in which the ALJ makes inconsistent and conflicting findings of fact and determinations on a disputed issue will be remanded to the ALJ to make determinations that are consistent and supported by the evidence. See generally Appeals Panel Decision 171955, decided October 17, 2017. However, in the instant case we have affirmed the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury). The ALJ’s finding of fact that because there is no compensable injury the issue as to the timely reporting of an injury to the claimed employer is moot is legally correct. Therefore, under the circumstances in this case, we reverse the ALJ’s determination that the carrier is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001, and we render a new decision that because there is no compensable injury the issue as to the timely reporting of an injury to the claimed employer is moot.
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that the claimant, for workers’ compensation purposes, was not an employee of (employer), at the time of the claimed injury on (date of injury).
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury).
We affirm the ALJ’s determination that because the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, the claimant did not have disability from June 30, 2018, through September 1, 2018.
We reverse the ALJ’s determination that the carrier is relieved from liability under Section 409.002 because of the claimant’s failure to timely notify his employer pursuant to Section 409.001, and we render a new decision that because there is no compensable injury the issue as to the timely reporting of an injury to the claimed employer is moot.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is TEXAS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
RICHARD J. GERGASKO, PRESIDENT
2200 ALDRICH STREET
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78723.
Carisa Space-Beam
Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Cristina Beceiro
Appeals Judge
Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge