This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 9, 2001. With regard to the issues before him, the hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant) suffered an injury in the course and scope of his employment on ___________; that the claimant’s disability started on September 5, 1999, and ended on January 5, 2000; that the claimant is not barred from receiving workers’ compensation benefits due to making a knowing election of remedies; and that the appellant (carrier) did not waive the right to dispute compensability by not contesting the injury within 60 days of receiving written notice of the claimed injury.
The carrier appealed, arguing that the hearing officer erred in entering Finding of Fact Nos. 1(A), (B), and (C) and Conclusion of Law No. 3 as contrary to the stipulated date of injury. The carrier also appeals Finding of Fact No. 3 and Conclusion of Law No. 4 as against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The claimant did not respond to the appeal.
DECISION
Affirmed, as reformed.
We note that the parties stipulated to the date of injury as __________. We reform Findings of Fact Nos. 1(A), (B), and (C) and Conclusion of Law No. 3 to reflect the date of __________.
The hearing officer found that the claimant suffered an injury while performing his regular job duties, pushing carts from the parking lot back into the store. The hearing officer found the claimant’s testimony credible and determined that the claimant sought emergency room treatment, was diagnosed with a back strain/muscle tear, and was taken off work for three days. The hearing officer determined that the claimant’s disability started on September 5, 1999, and ended on January 5, 2000. He resolved the conflicts in the evidence in favor of the claimant, determining him to be credible and believable when testifying. The testimony and the medical evidence presented at the hearing sufficiently support the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on ___________, and had disability from September 5, 1999, through January 5, 2000.
It is the hearing officer, as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)), who resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence (Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ)), and determines what facts have been established from the conflicting evidence. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Escalera, 385 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.). This is equally true of medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The Appeals Panel will not disturb the challenged factual findings of a hearing officer unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not find them so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed, as reformed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
SUITE 750
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge