This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 25, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the compensable injury sustained by the appellant (claimant) on ___________, did not extend to spinal stenosis from L4-S1. The claimant appeals, arguing that the medical evidence is sufficient to show that the ___________, injury exacerbated his preexisting, but asymptomatic, spinal stenosis to the extent that he is now unable to work. The respondent (carrier) replies, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
An injury is “damage or harm to the physical structure of the body and a disease or infection naturally resulting from the damage or harm.” Section 401.011(26). Whether an employee has “a disease or infection naturally resulting from the damage or harm,” or whether an injury extends to a particular member of his body is a factual matter for the hearing officer to determine. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Where the matter of the causation of the claimed injury is beyond common knowledge or experience, expert evidence to a reasonable degree of medical probability is required. Schaefer v. Texas Employers’ Insurance Association, 612 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1980); Houston General Insurance Company v. Pegues, 514 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The claimant sustained a compensable injury to his right leg, left elbow, and low back on ___________, when, after slipping on oily steps, he fell against a machine and became entangled in handles on the machine. The claimant had preexisting spinal stenosis, but the hearing officer concluded that the compensable injury event of ___________, was not a producing cause of any enhancement, acceleration, or worsening of the claimant’s preexisting spinal stenosis. The medical evidence relied on by the hearing officer came from Dr. B, the required medical examination doctor, who found “no evidence of structural change or aggravation as a result of the work injury in question.” The evidence sufficiently supports the hearing officer’s factual determination that the compensable injury does not extend to spinal stenosis from L4-S1.
The hearing officer is the trier of fact and is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and of the weight and credibility to be given to the evidence. Section 410.165(a). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony because the finder of fact judges the credibility of each and every witness, determines the weight to assign to each witness’s testimony, and resolves conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93426, decided July 5, 1993. This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The Appeals Panel will not substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). Only were we to conclude, which we do not in this case, that the hearing officer’s determinations are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust, would there be a sound basis to disturb those determinations. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Since we find the evidence sufficient to support the determinations of the hearing officer, we will not substitute our judgment for his. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94044, decided February 17, 1994.
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICES COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge