This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on October 24, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by concluding that the compensable injury does extend to or include the respondent’s (claimant) right wrist (carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS)) and that the claimant had disability from February 9, 2001, through April 15, 2001. The appellant (carrier) appealed, arguing that the determinations of the hearing officer were not sufficiently supported by the evidence. The claimant responds, urging the factual sufficiency of the evidence.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant worked as a cashier for the employer. It was undisputed that on ___________, the claimant sustained a compensable injury. The claimant testified that she injured her right thumb on that date, when she got it caught between clothes hangers, and later experienced numbness and tingling in her right hand.
The carrier contends that when CTS is being claimed as a result of a single event, as opposed to repetitive activities, expert medical evidence on causation is required. The carrier further argues that the medical evidence presented at the CCH is insufficient to support the hearing officer’s determination that the compensable injury extends to and includes the right wrist (CTS). In a medical report dated May 25, 2001, the claimant’s treating doctor, Dr. Z, stated that “it was the accident that caused the traumatic inflammation to the tissues in her right hand and wrist causing symptomatic traumatic [CTS] and the disability.”
Conflicting evidence was presented at the hearing regarding the extent of the compensable injury. Extent of injury is a question of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence including the medical evidence. Section 410.165(a); and see Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence, an appeals panel should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). There is sufficient evidence to support the hearing officer’s decision.
The claimant also had the burden to prove that she had disability. The hearing officer decided that the claimant had disability from February 9 to April 15, 2001. The carrier contends that the hearing officer’s decision is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. In workers’ compensation cases, the issues of injury and disability may generally be established by the claimant’s testimony alone. Houston General Insurance Company v. Pegues, 514 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.). There was documentary evidence that Dr. Z took the claimant off work on February 9, 2001, and the claimant testified that she returned to work on April 16, 2001. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). We conclude that the hearing officer’s decision is supported by sufficient evidence and that it is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge