This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on October 30, 2001. Resolving the disputed issues before him, the hearing officer determined that the respondent/cross-appellant’s (claimant) ___________, compensable injury extended to reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) of the claimant’s right lower extremity, but did not extend to the claimant’s RSD of either her left or right upper extremity. In addition, the hearing officer determined that the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) had jurisdiction to decide whether the ___________, compensable injury extended to RSD of the claimant’s left upper extremity because the dispute at a previous CCH did not address that issue, as the RSD was not then claimed to exist. Further, the hearing officer resolved that the claimant had disability from September 25, 1998, through October 7, 1998, and from February 18, 1999, through the date of the CCH. The appellant/cross-respondent (self-insured) appealed most determinations on sufficiency grounds and the claimant responded. The claimant appealed the determination that her compensable injury did not extend to include her RSD in both upper extremities and the self-insured responded, arguing that the claimant’s appeal was untimely and otherwise without merit.
DECISION
The hearing officer’s decision is affirmed.
We first address the self-insured’s argument that the claimant’s appeal is untimely per Section 410.202(a) of the 1989 Act and Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 143.3(c) (Rule 143.3(c)). Rule 143.3(c) provides that a request shall be presumed to be timely filed if it is: (1) mailed on or before the 15th day after the date of receipt of the hearing officer’s decision; and (2) received by the Commission not later than the 20th day after the date of receipt of the hearing officer’s decision. Both portions of Rule 143.3(c) must be complied with in order for an appeal to be timely. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94065, decided March 1, 1994. Pursuant to Section 410.202(d), effective for an appeal filed on or after June 17, 2001, Saturdays and Sundays and holidays listed in Section 662.003, Government Code, are not included in the computation of the time in which a request for an appeal or a response must be filed. Unless the great weight of the evidence indicates otherwise, the claimant is deemed to have received the order five days after the date it was mailed. Rule 102.5(d). The claimant states that she did not receive the order until November 7, 2001, which is five days after the Commission’s distribution date of November 2, 2001, so it would have been the deemed receipt date as well. Thus, the claimant had until November 29, 2001, to mail the appeal to the Commission, and the claimant’s appeal is dated, and stamped received by the Commission, November 29, 2001. Thus, the claimant’s appeal is timely and the self-insured’s argument in that regard is insupportable.
We have reviewed the other, substantive, complained-of determinations and conclude that the issues involved questions for the hearing officer to resolve. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). The hearing officer reviewed the record and decided what facts were established. We conclude that the hearing officer’s determinations are not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the self-insured is (a certified self-insured) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Terri Kay Oliver – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
Robert E. Lang
Appeals Panel
Manager/Judge