Title: 

APD 013011

Significant Decision

Date: 

January 17, 2002

Issues: 

Unavailable

Table of Contents

APD 013011

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 6, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury on ______________, and had disability from ______________, through the date of the hearing. The appellant (carrier) appeals those determinations on sufficiency grounds. The claimant responds urging affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on ______________. The claimant had the burden to prove that he sustained damage or harm to the physical structure of his body, arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 992486, decided December 29, 1999. There was conflicting evidence presented with regard to this issue. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). As the trier of fact, the hearing officer resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and decides what facts the evidence has established. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The hearing officer’s injury determination is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Thus, no sound basis exists for us to reverse that determination on appeal. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986).

The hearing officer likewise did not err in determining that the claimant had disability from ______________, through the date of the hearing. Disability is a question of fact to be determined by the hearing officer. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 000303, decided March 29, 2000. In view of the claimant’s testimony and the medical evidence, we cannot conclude that the hearing officer’s disability determination is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to compel its reversal. Cain, supra.

Finally, the carrier contends that the hearing officer abused her discretion in denying its Motion to Compel and its Motion for a Continuance. Section 410.155 provides that the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission may grant a continuance only if it determines there is good cause for the continuance. Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 142.10(c)(3) (Rule 142.10(c)(3)) provides that in addition to showing good cause, the movant must show that a continuance will not prejudice the rights of the other party. We review rulings on motions under an abuse of discretion standard; that is, whether the hearing officer acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 951252, decided September 13, 1995. The guiding principle or test for the existence of good cause to grant a continuance is that of ordinary prudence; that is, whether the movant exercised the degree of diligence in prosecuting the case as an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 970135, decided March 12, 1997. Upon review of the record, we are satisfied that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in denying the carrier’s motions.

The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING/RSKCO and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is:

CT CORPORATION

350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET

DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.

Elaine M. Chaney

CONCUR:

Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge

Edward Vilano – Appeals Judge