This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on November 13, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the appellant’s (claimant) compensable injury of _______________, does not include an injury of a left scaphoid fracture and arthrosis. The claimant appealed, arguing essentially that the hearing officer erred in determining extent of injury. The respondent (carrier) filed a response, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The parties stipulated that on _______________, the claimant sustained a compensable injury, in the form of carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS). That claimant testified that on _______________, he felt a pop in his wrist while he was performing his job duties. The claimant sought medical treatment for left wrist pain and he was diagnosed with CTS on September 28, 2000. The claimant underwent one carpal tunnel release on November 2, 2001, and another carpal tunnel release with a trigger finger release on May 11, 2001. The claimant testified that he continued to have pain to his left wrist. On September 10, 2001, Dr. C diagnosed a scaphoid nonunion or fracture and arthrosis to the claimant’s left wrist.
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant’s compensable injury of _______________, does not extend to and include an injury of a left scaphoid fracture and arthrosis. Extent of injury is a question of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. The medical reports in evidence sufficiently support the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant has an “old, pre-existing nonunion fracture of the scaphoid bone in his left wrist” and that the “non-union fracture of the scaphoid bone has resulted in the development of arthrosis at the site of the nonunion fracture.”
It is the hearing officer, as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)), who resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence (Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ)), and determines what facts have been established from the conflicting evidence. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Escalera, 385 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.). This is equally true of medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The Appeals Panel will not disturb the challenged factual findings of a hearing officer unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not find them so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS STREET
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge