This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on October 17, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury on ___________; that the respondent (carrier) did not specifically contest compensability on the issue of preexisting condition pursuant to Section 409.022 and Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 124.2(f) (Rule 124.2(f)); and that the claimant did not have disability as a result of the claimed injury. The claimant appeals the adverse determinations on compensability and disability, and complains of the hearing officer’s dismissal of the carrier’s failure to contest compensability on the issue of a preexisting condition as irrelevant. The carrier responds, requesting affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The hearing officer concluded that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had either a work-related injury or an occupational injury sustained in the course and scope of his employment. He further determined that the claimant failed to show a causal connection between his work and the loss of his hearing. These were factual determinations which are within the sole province of the hearing officer. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). We will reverse a factual determination of a hearing officer only if that determination is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard of review to the record of this case, we decline to substitute our opinion of the credibility of the evidence for that of the hearing officer.
We also find no error in the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant did not have disability, as the 1989 Act requires a finding of the existence of a compensable injury as prerequisite to a finding of disability. Section 401.011(16).
As to the contest of compensability under Section 409.022, the carrier’s position that the issue was inappropriately phrased at the CCH is well taken. The real concern under Section 409.022 and Rule 124.2(f) is whether the carrier’s controversion “contain[s] sufficient claim-specific substantive information to enable the employee/legal beneficiary to understand the carrier’s position or action taken on the claim.” The Payment of Compensation or Notice of Refused/Disputed Claim (TWCC-21) in this case specifies that the carrier is disputing on the bases that the claimant’s injury is an ordinary disease of life and it is not work related or was not sustained within the course and scope of employment. Our review of the record persuades us that the hearing officer had sufficient evidence upon which he could base his conclusion that the carrier was not raising a new defense of a preexisting condition, but rather continuing its consistent assertion that the claimant was unable to show that he had an injury that was causally related to his work. The claimant’s assertion of error is without merit.
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is ZURICH NORTH AMERICA and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
GARY SUDOL
9330 LBJ FREEWAY, SUITE 1200
DALLAS, TEXAS 75243.
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge