Following a contested case hearing on July 12, 2001, pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act), the hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by determining that the respondent’s (claimant) compensable right wrist sprain injury of ___________, extends to and includes right de Quervain’s tenosynovitis; that the employer did not tender a bona fide offer of employment to the claimant on either January 27, 2001, or April 18, 2001; and that the claimant had disability beginning on January 25, 2001, and continuing through June 3, 2001, and for no other period. An appeal was filed by the appellant (carrier), asserting that these determinations are not sufficiently supported by the evidence and should be reversed. The claimant filed a response urging that the evidence is sufficient to support the challenged determinations and to warrant our affirmance. We first reversed and remanded this cause for carrier information in compliance with House Bill 2600, in Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 011876, decided September 24, 2001. The case has come back with both the carrier and the claimant reurging the arguments set forth on the first appeal.
DECISION
Affirmed.
It was undisputed that on ___________, the claimant was employed by (employer), a temporary staffing concern, and that he sustained a compensable right wrist sprain injury on that date while working at (plant) as a wrapper/strapper machine operator. The claimant testified that on that date, as he was using both hands and arms to reposition a 150-pound pallet load of plastic buckets to line it up for the printer conveyor, he heard a “pop” in his right wrist and felt a sharp pain which radiated up his arm. He said he finished his shift, reported the injury the next day to the employer’s personnel manager, Ms. B, who sent him to the clinic used by the employer, and that he later began treating with Dr. L who took him off work. The claimant indicated that he remained off work until June 3, 2001, when he commenced working a light-duty job for the employer in another city. Dr. L’s report of January 29, 2001, states the diagnoses as right-hand sprain/strain, right de Quervain’s tenosynovitis, and muscle spasm. Dr. L also states that “these conditions are, within medical probability, related to the work related injury of ___________.” In his February 22 and April 3, 2001, peer review reports for the carrier, Dr. S stated that the development of a de Quervain’s tenosynovitis after only a few days of employment is “not likely,” that such condition usually requires repetitive use of the wrists with microtrauma to the first extensor compartment for longer than two days,” and that this is “a disease of continued repetitive use that would take months to develop . . . .” Dr. V, a required medical examination doctor appointed by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission, wrote on July 10, 2001, that he “cannot say” that the claimant’s de Quervain’s tenosynovitis is causally related to his job.
The carrier introduced employer letters to the claimant dated January 27 and April 18, 2001, which inform the claimant of the employer’s offer of a modified-duty temporary assignment in the employer’s office doing clerical work. The claimant recalled seeing the first letter but indicated he had already been taken off all work by Dr. L and did not recall receiving the second letter. Neither letter had an attached copy of a Work Status Report (TWCC-73) as required by Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 129.6(c) (Rule 129.6(c)), and the hearing officer so found.
The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence including the medical evidence (Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ)). The Appeals Panel will not disturb the challenged factual findings of a hearing officer unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not find them so in this case. Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
Robert E. Lang
Appeals Panel
Manager/Judge