This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on May 14, 2004. With respect to the single issue before him, the hearing officer determined that appellant 1’s (claimant) _______________, compensable injury does not extend to and include a lumbar sprain/strain and lumbar facet syndrome. The claimant and appellant 2 (subclaimant) have appealed the extent-of-injury determination as being against the great weight of the evidence. In its response to the appeal, the respondent (self-insured) urges affirmance.
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant’s compensable injury of _______________, does not extend to include a lumbar sprain/strain injury and lumbar facet syndrome. That issue presented a question of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. The hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. Section 410.165(a). It was a matter for the hearing officer to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence, and to decide what facts the evidence has established. Garza v. Commercial Ins. Co., 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). In this instance, the hearing officer was not persuaded that the claimant sustained the burden of proof on the extent issue. Nothing in our review of the record reveals that the challenged determination is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Accordingly, no sound basis exists for us to reverse that determination on appeal. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986).
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).
Elaine M. Chaney
Veronica L. Ruberto