This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on May 18, 2004. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by deciding that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease with a date of injury of _______________; that the claimant has disability from September 9, 2003, through the present; and that the extent of injury includes tenosynovitis and/or a sprain/strain of both the wrists. The appellant (carrier) appealed, arguing that the claimant failed to establish that she had an injury in the course and scope of employment on _______________, or that the alleged injury extends to include tenosynovitis and/or a sprain/strain of both the wrists. The carrier additionally argues that the claimant did not have a compensable injury in the course and scope of employment, and therefore had no disability. The claimant responded, urging affirmance of the challenged determinations.
The claimant had the burden to prove that she sustained a compensable injury. The claimant claimed that she sustained a repetitive trauma injury as a result of performing her work activities for the employer. Section 401.011(34) provides that an occupational disease includes a repetitive trauma injury, which is defined in Section 401.011(36). The issues of injury, the extent of the injury, and disability were questions of fact for the hearing officer. Conflicting evidence was presented regarding the issues. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision, we will reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). We have reviewed the challenged determinations. The hearing officer's decision is supported by sufficient evidence and is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain, supra; In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
LEO F. MALO
12222 MERIT DRIVE, SUITE 700
DALLAS, TEXAS 75251-2237.
Margaret L. Turner
Thomas A. Knapp